Nghiên cứu mối quan hệ động giữa sở hữu quản lý và hiệu suất doanh nghiệp tại Việt Nam

Nghiên cứu mối quan hệ động giữa quyền sở hữu quản lý và hiệu suất doanh nghiệp tại Việt Nam, cung cấp cái nhìn sâu sắc cho các nhà đầu tư.

• Tác giả: Nguyen Thi Thanh An
• Người hướng dẫn: Dr. Vo Hong Duc
• Trường học: University of Economics
• Chuyên ngành: Development Economics
• Đề tài: Mối Quan Hệ Giữa Sở Hữu Quản Lý Và Hiệu Suất Doanh Nghiệp
• Loại tài liệu: Thesis
• Năm xuất bản: 2016
• Địa điểm: Ho Chi Minh City

Mục lục chi tiết

• DECLARATION
• ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• ABSTRACT
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• LIST OF TABLES
• LIST OF FIGURES
• LIST OF ABBREVIATION
• 1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
• 1.1. Problem statement
• 1.2. Research objectives
• 1.3. Research questions
• 1.4. Contributions of the thesis
• 1.5. Research scope
• 1.6. Structure of the thesis
• 2. CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
• 2.1. The theoretical background of managerial ownership and firm’s performance
• 2.1.1. The agency approach
• 2.1.2. The incentive effect
• 2.1.3. The entrenchment effect
• 2.1.4. The managerial discretion approach
• 2.1.5. The timing approach
• 2.1.6. Endogeneity of managerial ownership
• 2.2. The empirical evidences of relationship between managerial ownership and firm’s performance and limitations
• 2.2.1. The research in worldwide and the limitations
• 2.2.2. The exogenous managerial ownership
• 2.2.3. The endogenous managerial ownership
• 2.2.4. The empirical evidence in Vietnam
• 2.2.5. The corporate governance of Vietnamese listed firms
• 2.2.6. The conceptual framework
• 3. CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA
• 3.1. Definition and measurements of firm’s performance
• 3.1.1. Accounting – based measurements
• 3.1.2. Market–based measurements
• 3.2. Definition and measurement of managerial ownership
• 3.3. The empirical model
• 3.3.1. The determinants of firm’s performance and optimal managerial ownership
• 3.3.1.1. The determinants of firm’s performance
• 3.3.1.2. The determinants of optimal managerial ownership level
• 3.3.1.3. The movement of actual managerial ownership
• 3.3.2. The explanation of the large change in managerial ownership
• 3.3.3. The dynamic relationship between managerial ownership and firm’s performance
• 4. CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
• 4.1. The determinants and movement of managerial ownership
• 4.1.1. The determinants of managerial ownership
• 4.1.2. The movement of actual managerial ownership
• 4.1.3. The explanation of the large change (decrease or increase)
• 4.1.3.1. The statistics by group
• 4.1.3.2. The likelihood regression of large change (increase or decrease) against the change in firms’ characteristics and market condition
• 4.2. Dynamics of managerial ownership and firm’s performance
• 4.2.1. Firm’s performance: accounting-based measurement
• 4.2.2. Firm’s performance: market-based measurement
• 5. CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
• 5.1. The implications for enterprises
• 5.2. The implications for Vietnam’s authority and the Government
• 5.3. The limitations and further research
• 5.3.1. The further research
• LIST OF TABLES
• LIST OF FIGURES
• LIST OF ABBREVIATION

Tóm tắt

I. Tổng quan về mối quan hệ giữa sở hữu quản lý và hiệu suất doanh nghiệp

Mối quan hệ giữa sở hữu quản lý và hiệu suất doanh nghiệp đã thu hút sự quan tâm của nhiều nhà nghiên cứu và thực hành trong lĩnh vực quản trị doanh nghiệp. Sở hữu quản lý được coi là một yếu tố quan trọng trong việc giảm thiểu vấn đề đại diện giữa các cổ đông và ban quản lý. Nghiên cứu này sẽ xem xét các khía cạnh khác nhau của sở hữu quản lý và tác động của nó đến hiệu suất doanh nghiệp.

1.1. Khái niệm sở hữu quản lý và hiệu suất doanh nghiệp

Sở hữu quản lý đề cập đến tỷ lệ cổ phần mà các nhà quản lý nắm giữ trong doanh nghiệp. Hiệu suất doanh nghiệp thường được đo bằng các chỉ số như lợi nhuận trên tài sản (ROA) và tỷ lệ Tobin's Q. Nghiên cứu đã chỉ ra rằng sở hữu quản lý có thể ảnh hưởng đến quyết định đầu tư và chiến lược kinh doanh của công ty.

1.2. Tầm quan trọng của nghiên cứu này

Nghiên cứu này không chỉ cung cấp cái nhìn sâu sắc về mối quan hệ giữa sở hữu quản lý và hiệu suất doanh nghiệp mà còn giúp các nhà quản lý và nhà đầu tư hiểu rõ hơn về cách thức tối ưu hóa cấu trúc sở hữu để nâng cao hiệu suất.

II. Vấn đề và thách thức trong nghiên cứu sở hữu quản lý

Mặc dù có nhiều nghiên cứu về tác động của sở hữu quản lý đến hiệu suất, nhưng vẫn còn nhiều vấn đề và thách thức cần giải quyết. Một trong những thách thức lớn nhất là việc đo lường chính xác mức độ sở hữu quản lý và tác động của nó đến hiệu suất doanh nghiệp.

2.1. Khó khăn trong việc đo lường sở hữu quản lý

Việc xác định tỷ lệ sở hữu quản lý không chỉ dựa vào cổ phần trực tiếp mà còn cần xem xét cả sở hữu gián tiếp thông qua các bên liên quan. Điều này làm cho việc đánh giá chính xác mức độ ảnh hưởng của sở hữu quản lý trở nên phức tạp.

2.2. Tác động của môi trường kinh doanh

Môi trường kinh doanh tại Việt Nam có thể ảnh hưởng đến mối quan hệ giữa sở hữu quản lý và hiệu suất doanh nghiệp. Các yếu tố như chính sách của nhà nước, sự cạnh tranh trên thị trường và tình hình kinh tế có thể làm thay đổi cách thức mà sở hữu quản lý tác động đến hiệu suất.

III. Phương pháp nghiên cứu mối quan hệ giữa sở hữu quản lý và hiệu suất

Để nghiên cứu mối quan hệ này, các phương pháp định lượng và định tính sẽ được áp dụng. Nghiên cứu sẽ sử dụng dữ liệu từ các công ty niêm yết trên sàn chứng khoán TP.HCM trong giai đoạn từ 2010 đến 2015.

3.1. Dữ liệu và mẫu nghiên cứu

Mẫu nghiên cứu bao gồm 285 công ty không thuộc lĩnh vực tài chính, cho phép phân tích mối quan hệ giữa sở hữu quản lý và hiệu suất doanh nghiệp trong bối cảnh cụ thể của Việt Nam.

3.2. Các chỉ số đo lường hiệu suất doanh nghiệp

Hiệu suất doanh nghiệp sẽ được đo lường thông qua các chỉ số như ROA, ROE và tỷ lệ Tobin's Q. Những chỉ số này sẽ giúp đánh giá tác động của sở hữu quản lý đến hiệu suất một cách toàn diện.

IV. Kết quả nghiên cứu và ứng dụng thực tiễn

Kết quả nghiên cứu sẽ cung cấp cái nhìn sâu sắc về mối quan hệ giữa sở hữu quản lý và hiệu suất doanh nghiệp. Những phát hiện này có thể được áp dụng để cải thiện chiến lược quản lý và đầu tư.

4.1. Phân tích kết quả nghiên cứu

Kết quả cho thấy rằng sở hữu quản lý có tác động tích cực đến hiệu suất doanh nghiệp, nhưng chỉ đến một mức độ nhất định. Sau đó, tác động này có thể trở nên tiêu cực do các yếu tố như sự bảo thủ trong quyết định đầu tư.

4.2. Ứng dụng trong thực tiễn

Các doanh nghiệp có thể sử dụng những phát hiện này để điều chỉnh cấu trúc sở hữu của mình, từ đó tối ưu hóa hiệu suất và giá trị doanh nghiệp.

V. Kết luận và triển vọng tương lai của nghiên cứu

Nghiên cứu này không chỉ cung cấp cái nhìn sâu sắc về mối quan hệ giữa sở hữu quản lý và hiệu suất doanh nghiệp mà còn mở ra hướng nghiên cứu mới trong tương lai.

5.1. Tóm tắt các phát hiện chính

Các phát hiện chính cho thấy rằng sở hữu quản lý có ảnh hưởng đáng kể đến hiệu suất doanh nghiệp, nhưng cần phải xem xét các yếu tố khác như môi trường kinh doanh và chiến lược quản lý.

5.2. Hướng nghiên cứu trong tương lai

Nghiên cứu trong tương lai có thể tập trung vào việc khám phá các yếu tố khác ảnh hưởng đến mối quan hệ này, cũng như áp dụng các phương pháp nghiên cứu mới để có cái nhìn sâu sắc hơn.

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UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS INSTITUDE OF SOCIAL STUDIES HO CHI MINH CITY THE HAGUE VIETNAM THE NETHERLANDS VIETNAM- NETHERLANDS PROGRAMME FOR M.A IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS THE DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP AND FIRM’S PERFORMANCE IN VIETNAM BY NGUYEN THI THANH AN MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS HO CHI MINH CITY, NOVEMBER 2016 TIEU LUAN MOI download : [e-mail] UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS INSTITUDE OD SOCIAL STUDIES HO CHI MINH CITY THE HAGUE VIETNAM THE NETHERLANDS VIETNAM- NETHERLANDS PROGRAMME FOR M.A IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS THE DYNAMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MANAGERIAL OWNERSHIP AND FIRM’S PERFORMANCE IN VIETNAM A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS By NGUYEN THI THANH AN Academic Supervisor Dr. VO HONG DUC Ho Chi Minh City, November 2016 TIEU LUAN MOI download : [e-mail] DECLARATION The work in this dissertation entitled “The dynamic relationship between managerial ownership and firm’s performance in Vietnam” which has been implemented by me to fulfill the requirement of Master of Art in Development Economics at Vietnam - The Netherlands Programme. I hereby certify that this thesis is a result of my own efforts, and any sources would be acknowledged. This is original research which have been submitted neither whole nor a part of research for any other degree. HCMC, November, 2016 Nguyen Thi Thanh An i TIEU LUAN MOI download : [e-mail] ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS First of all, the thesis had implemented with the assistance and encouragement of my principal supervisor Dr. Vo Hong Duc. I would like to emphasize the thankful gratitude and appreciation to him. His guidance helps me develop my dissertation throughout all stages of processing thesis. He also devotes his valuable time for me and my team to encourage and share his experience in study as well as in real life. In addition, I would like thank Dr. Truong Dang Thuy who is patient and sympathetic in provision of econometric technique and supporting in any question. My thanks also go to all of staffs at VNP, especially Ms. Xuan Hong has already assisted the students with her dedication. Furthermore, I also acknowledged all of classmates in Class 21. I had the opportunity to work and learn in an intimate and supportive class. Above all, I most deeply thank to my parents who always support in any project and intention and love me without condition over 26 years. HCMC, November, 2016 Nguyen Thi Thanh An ii TIEU LUAN MOI download : [e-mail] ABSTRACT Corporate governance is generally considered as a key factor for the operational success for enterprises. One of the most frequently discussed concepts among corporate governance factors is the ownership structure, in particular, managerial ownership. Various empirical studies have been conducted to consider and examine the impact of diverse ownership structure aspects on firm’s performance which is proxied by various dimensions including accounting return, market evaluation and probability of bankruptcy. Findings from various empirical studies on the above issue are mixed due to the following reasons. First, it is difficult to capture appropriately the power of managers in making decisions. In the developing countries, managers also control the firm via the ownership of related parties. As such, this study is conducted to measure managerial ownership in terms of (i) direct ownership and (ii) indirect ownership to achieve the better measurement. Second, many authors argued that managerial ownership should be treated as endogenous parameter and the relationship between managerial ownership and firm’s performance is non-monotonic. To deal with endogeneity of managerial ownership, this study focuses on the effect of the change in managerial ownership (managers’ decision to purchasing and selling stocks) on the change in firm’s performance. To achieve these objectives, a panel data of 285 listed firms on Ho Chi Minh City Stock Exchange (HOSE) for the period from 2010 to 2015 is utilized. Findings from this study indicate that the percentage of stocks owned by managers and their related parties significantly fluctuated. In addition, the actual managerial ownership level tends to move away from the optimal level due to the existence of adjustment costs. Furthermore, managers are likely to sell stock when the entire financial market performed well. Notwithstanding, the managers do not purchase stoFcks in the case of illiquid market and deteriorating performance. Findings from this study also present evidence to confirm the view that the reduction of lagged managerial ownership level would send a signal in relation to the quality of firm, and would also provide the negative impact on firm’s performance regarding market evaluation. However, the study fails to provide empirical evidence in relation to the change in managerial ownership against the change in firm’s return on total assets the accounting- based measurement. Key words: Managerial ownership, Firm’s performance, Endogeneity, Market-based measurement, Accounting-based measurement. iii TIEU LUAN MOI download : [e-mail] TABLE OF CONTENTS DECLARATION . iii TABLE OF CONTENTS . iv LIST OF TABLES .vii LIST OF FIGURES . viii LIST OF ABBREVIATION . ix CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION .4 Contributions of the thesis .6 Structure of the thesis . 4 CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW.1 The theoretical background of managerial ownership and firm’s performance.1 The agency approach .1 The incentive effect .2 The entrenchment effect .2 The managerial discretion approach .3 The timing approach .2 Endogeneity of managerial ownership. 10 iv TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail.3 The empirical evidences of relationship between managerial ownership and firm’s performance and limitations .1 The research in worldwide and the limitations .1 The exogenous managerial ownership .2 The endogenous managerial ownership .2 The empirical evidence in Vietnam.4 The corporate governance of Vietnamese listed firms .5 The conceptual framework . 21 CHAPTER 3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA .1 Definition and measurements of firm’s performance.1 Accounting – based measurements .2 Market–based measurements .2 Definition and measurement of managerial ownership .4 The empirical model .1 The determinants of firm’s performance and optimal managerial ownership .1 The determinants of firm’s performance .2 The determinants of optimal managerial ownership level .3 The movement of actual managerial ownership .2 The explanation of the large change in managerial ownership.3 The dynamic relationship between managerial ownership and firm’s performance. 34 CHAPTER 4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS . 36 v TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail.2 The determinants and movement of managerial ownership .1 The determinants of managerial ownership .2 The movement of actual managerial ownership.3 The explanation of the large change (decrease or increase) .1 The statistics by group .2 The likelihood regression of large change (increase or decrease) against the change in firms’ characteristics and market condition.4 Dynamics of managerial ownership and firm’s performance.1 Firm’s performance: accounting-based measurement .2 Firm’s performance: market-based measurement. 55 CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS .1 The implications for enterprises .2 The implications for Vietnam’s authority and the Government .3 The limitations and further research.2 The further research . 70 vi TIEU LUAN MOI download : [e-mail] LIST OF TABLES Table 3.1 Tests are ultilized to find the appropriate model .2 The determinants of optimal managerial ownership level.3 The summary of variables employed in Probit model.1 Summary statistics of firm’s characteristics of 285 firms listed on HOSE from 2010 to 2015) period.2 Statistical summary of variables separated by year.3 Statistical summary of variables separated by industry .4 Correlation coefficients between managerial ownership and firm’s attributes.5 The relationship between level of managerial ownership and firm’s performance.6 The determinants of managerial ownership level.7 The movement actual mangerial ownership level toward to estimated optimal level.8 Statistical summary of data by data source.9 Large change in managerial ownership against change in firm’s attributes and market condition.10 The effect of lagged managerial ownership change on firm’s performance change in terms of accounting-based measurement.11 The effect of lagged change in managerial ownership on firm’s performance in terms of market-based measurement. 57 vii TIEU LUAN MOI download : [e-mail] LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1 The relationship between insider ownership and firm’s performance.2 The management structure of shareholding company .3 The internal governance structure of a listed company .4 The conceptual framework .1 The nonlinear relation between the lagged change in managerial ownership and the change in return on total assets (ROA) .2 The nonlinear relation between the lagged change in managerial ownership and the change in market evaluation of firm’s performance (Tobin’s Q) . 55 viii TIEU LUAN MOI download : [e-mail] LIST OF ABBREVIATION AMEX American Stock Exchange CEO Chief Executive Officer GMM Generalized method of moments GMS General Meeting of Shareholders FE Fixed effect FGLS Flexible generalized least squares FP Firm’s performance HNX Hanoi Stock Exchange HOSE Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange IFC International Finance Corporation IV Instrument variable MO Managerial ownership MV Market value NASDAQ National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations NYSE New York Stock Exchange OLS Ordinary least square R&D Research & Development RE Random effect ROA Return on assets ROE Return on equity P/E Price/ Earnings ratio SEC Securities and Exchange Act 2SLS Two Stage Least Square SSC State Securities Commission UPCOM Unlisted Public Company Market ix TIEU LUAN MOI download : [e-mail] Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Problem statement In corporate world, the separation between principals (owners) and the agents (managers), or the ownership and control of the firm, induces the agency problem. Managerial ownership could generally be used as an effective mechanism to reduce this problem. As such, the optimal level of managerial ownership has attracted great attention from both academics and practitioners in a modern corporate governance framework. The ultimate objective of any firm is to maximize the firm’s value or to maximize owner’s propensity. However, in some cases, under managerial discretion, they will maximize their welfare (Kuhnen & Zwiebel, 2006; Lambrecht & Myer, 2007). Three considerable approaches which have been used to attempt to explain the mechanism of impact of managerial ownership on firm’s performance: (i) agency approach, (ii) managerial discretion approach, and (iii) timing approach. Most of the empirical studies presented a non-linear relationship between managerial ownership and firm’s performance. McConnell and Servaes (1990) found the reversed U-shaped relationship between Tobin’s Q and the level of insider ownership. MO also provides a positive effect on firm’s performance up to the threshold of 40 percent to 50 percent. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) examined this relationship with sectional data of 500 Fortune firms and concluded that the W-shaped between the level of MO and Tobin’s Q was found. However, Kole (1995) and Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999) argued that cross-sectional data cannot capture adequately the change in firm’s environment and endogeneity of MO. Many recent studies attempted to deal with endogeneity issue of MO with different approaches, however, some limitations still exists and many arguments in interpretation the result provoked. Kole and Lehn (1997) addressed an important issue of governance structure that has change over time. They also investigated the question as to what forces drive the change. In reality, Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan (1998) observed and detected the managerial ownership in the US listed firms changed over time. Under similar circumstance, a new approach in relation to the relationship between the change in managerial ownership and firm’s performance via the change in Tobin’s Q in American firms investigated by Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2008). The study attempted to examine the effect of the dynamic 1 TIEU LUAN MOI download : [e-mail] change in managerial ownership on the change in firm’s performance which can help eliminate endogeneity problem. They also argued that the information about managerial ownership fully absorbed by the market so change in managerial ownership in year t-1 affected to Tobin’s Q in year t. By concentrating on the change in managerial ownership level year by year, the decision of managers in selling and purchasing stock can be partially explained. In addition, by another approach – event study, McConnell, Servaes and Lins (2008) found that managers did not purchase share to move the optimal level as the explanation of agency approach. They also provided the evidence to prove that managers (insiders) could not get the abnormal returns which supported by the timing approach.