UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL STUDIES HO CHI MINH CITY ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM VIETNAM THE NETHERLANDS VIETNAM - NETHERLANDS PROGRAMME FOR M.A IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS Quantifying Effects of EU Antidumping Duty on Vietnam Footwear By NguyễnTrườngToan A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Development Economics Under the Supervision of: Assoc.PhạmHoàngVăn and Assoc.NguyễnTrọngHoài HO CHI MINH CITY, April 2014 TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail.com DECLARATION This is to certify that this thesis entitled “Quantifying effects of EU antidumping duty on Vietnam footwear”, which is submitted by me in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Art in Development Economic to the Vietnam – The Netherlands Programme. The thesis constitutes only my original work and due supervision and acknowledgement have been made in the text to all materials used. Nguyễn Trường Toan ii TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail.com ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would never have been able to finish my dissertationwithout the help and support of people surrounding me. First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude tomy mentors Assoc.
PhạmHoàngVăn, and Assoc. NguyễnTrọngHoài for the continuous support of my M. study and research; for their patience, encouragement, erudite knowledge. Their excellent guidance encouraged me in all the time of doing this study.
I have been strikingly lucky to have supervisors who cared so much my thesis, and answered to all my questions and queries punctually. I could not have imagined having better supervisors and advisors for my research. Besides my mentors, I would like to thank Dr Pham Khánh Nam and Prof Jame Riedel for their thorough comments and worthy ideas that help to enhance my thesis’s value. My sincere thanks also goes toall the lecturers at the Vietnam – NetherlandsProgram for their knowledge of all the courses, during the time I studied at theprogram.I would like to offer my special thanks to Dr.
LêVănChơn, Dr, TrươngĐăngThụy, Dr. Lorenzo pellegrini who help me significantly in the courses and thesis writing processes. In addition, I would like to express my great appreciation to my friends for their motivations. Last but not the least;I owe a very important debt tomy family: my parents NguyễnVănTố and Đỗ Thị Liễu, for giving birth to me at the first place and supporting me spiritually throughout my life.
Hồ Chí Minh city, April 2014 NguyễnTrườngToan iii TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail.com ABBREVIATIONS AD Antidumping Duties GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade WTO World Trade Organization EU European Union U.S United States EC European Commission C. freight CN8 8-digit Combined Nomenclature code HTS Harmonized Tariff Schedule F.B Free on Board GSO Vietnam General Statistics Office BTA Bilateral Trade Agreement USITC United States International Trade Committee EUROSTAT European Commission Statistic Office W.T wood and wooden, papers and textiles iv TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail.com ABSTRACT This paper examines effect of EU antidumping on Vietnam footwear firms. We find that EU AD causes a 52.8% decline of Vietnam targeted export products, at least. Besides value, there is 42.2% reduction of the least affected scenario.
For the most impacted images, it leads to a fall of 105.6% and 107,1% for value and volume in five years after AD, respectively. This paper also indicates that there is no association between AD and price of Vietnam export. We find very little evidence that Vietnam footwear firm’s revenue, labor payroll and jobs have association with AD. It is only small firms decline revenue, but small firms contribute only 1.65% total revenue of footwear.
And, there is no evidence that footwear firm discharge their employees because of AD. We find the explanation for this interesting phenomenon from trade diversion story. There is no evidence of product diversion of Vietnam firms to EU. But, it is strongly evident that Vietnam firms significantly diverse their markets toward U.
Keywords: Antidumping, Vietnam Footwear v TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail.com LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2. Home Import Demand. Foreign Export Supply Curve. Impact of tariff on import price and volume.
Effect of tariff on social welfare in case of large country. Effect of tariff on Home demand in case of small country. Effect of export subsidy on export country. Infant Industry Protection.
Impact of reciprocal dumping on welfare. Top five Vietnamese export goods exclude oil in 2004 .Top five footwear exporters to EU. EU import Vietnam AD footwear and non-AD footwear. Difference in Difference Method.
Trend of export value, quantity, price of Vietnam AD Footwear and control groups to EU. Some main Vietnamese export goods. Trend of export value, quantity, price of Vietnam Non-AD Footwearand control groups to EU. Trend of export value, quantity, price of Vietnam Footwear and control groups to USA.
70 LIST OF TABLE Table 1. Merchandise exports by selected economy (USA, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, China, Japan, India, Australia and New Zealand, South Africa, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italia) in billion USD. Vietnam Merchandise Trade in percent over GDP. Vietnam export to EU in million USD.
EU AD on Vietnam and People Republic China Footwear .Vietnam AD footwear export value, volume, price to US compareto control groups .Vietnam Non- AD footwear export value, volume, price to US compareto control groups. Descriptive Statistics of Vietnam Firms Characteristics .Vietnam footwear export value, volume, price to US compareto control groups .Vietnam AD footwear export value to EU compares to control groups .Vietnam AD footwear export volume to EU compares tocontrol groups. Vietnam AD footwear export price to EU compare tocontrol groups. Footwear firm’s revenue compares to Apparel over period 2004-2006 .5 Footwear firm’s revenue compares to Apparel over period 2003-2007 .Footwear firm’s revenue compare to W.Footwear firm’s revenue compare to W.Footwear labor’spayrollcompare to Apparelover period 2004-2006.
Footwear labor’spayrollcompare to W. 58 vi TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail. Footwear firm’s sizecompare to Apparelover period 2004-2006. Footwear firm’s sizecompare to W.Vietnam non-AD footwear export value to EU compares to control groups.
Vietnam non-AD footwear export volume to EUcompares tocontrol groups .Vietnam non-AD footwear export price to EU compares to control groups. US Import value of Vietnam footwear compares tocontrol groups .US Import volume of Vietnam footwear compares tocontrol groups .US Import price of Vietnam compares tocontrol groups .1Footwear labor’spayrollcompare to Apparelover period 2003-2007. Footwear labor’s payroll compare to W.3 Footwear firm’s size compare to Apparel over period 2003-2007 .4Footwear firm’s sizecompare to W. 89 vii TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail.com Contents Chapter 1: Introduction .1 Research context and problem statement .4 Research methodology, data and scope.
5 Chapter 2: Literature Review .1 Market analysis in context of Trade in a single industry .2 Effect of a tariff. 23 Chapter 3: An overview of Vietnamese Footwear Industry.1 EU tax rising on Vietnamese footwear .1 EU Import 8-digit (CN8) Data .2 Vietnam Enterprise Survey Data .3 US Import 10-digit (HTS10) Data. 36 Chapter 4: Model Estimation and Research Findings .1 Double Difference Approach .2 Double Difference in Multiple Years .3 Estimation Impact of EU Antidumping on Vietnam Footwear Export .4 Estimation Impact of EU Antidumping on Vietnam Footwear Firms.2 Firm size and labor payroll. 68 viii TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail.com Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion .3 Limitation and future direction.
87 ix TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail.com Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1 Research context and problem statement Trade has been growing significantly in recent decades. Basic statistics given by World Trade Organization (WTO) demonstrates undoubted evidence of impressive upward trend in export and import merchandises products (Table 1. Consequently, international economics study is getting more and more important. Some economists indicate trade as momentum of growth (Frankel & Romer, 1999; Irwin & Terviö, 2002; Wacziarg & Welch, 2008).
This might be explained by some main channels. Firstly, labor division could lead to efficiency gains. In addition, trade growth lead to larger market; thus, firms could get more benefit from economy of scale. Also, contract with foreign partners could import modern technology while competition creates more motivations to enhance skills and performance.
Trade openness could bring capital investment to low-capital countries as well. Why trade expands? Causes of trade openness were examined by (Baier & Bergstrand, 2001; P. Krugman, Cooper, & Srinivasan, 1995).They points out technology improvements, leading to cutting transportation cost and communication cost, are one of reason for trade enhancement. Furthermore, governments has been changing policies which aims to more integrated instead of bounded off; for example, joining bilateral trade agreement and multilateral trade agreement; boost international trade.
Although, general trend of policies target to more opened for trade. Nations exercise more temporary barriers such as Antidumping (AD) or technology barriers to bring up domestic producers in short-term. Merchandise exports by selected economy (USA, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, China, Japan, India, Australia and New Zealand, South Africa, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italia) in billion USD 1948 1953 1963 1973 1983 1993 2003 2011 58.52 1 TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail.com Source: author collected from WTO report Antidumping duties (AD) were not common in 1960s. According to (Schott, 1994), there are 10 cases per year in average.
However, this number increases rapidly in 1970s and 1980s since countries prefer AD than tariff. As AD rules of GATT/WTO is more flexible to interpret than other tariff rising(Blonigen & Prusa, 2001). It is recorded over 1600s AD petitions in 1980s (Finger & Artis, 1993).ADs used by members of WTO has promoted triply between beginning of 1980s and end of 1990s (Prusa, 2005).Moreover, since the world crisis happened in 2008, it causes the developed countries have trend to use AD as protection to domestic producers (Kee, Neagu, & Nicita, 2010). There are several motivations of AD.
Firstly, it is unambiguous GATT\WTO rules to eliminate tariff or at least reduce them. Besides that, number of countries joins bilateral trade agreements (BTA) or multi-lateral trade agreements have been augmenting significantly in recent decades. Those agreements have constrains which limit bring up tariffs. Also, those lead to an increase of import and then raise tensions of domestic suppliers.
Secondly, there is lack of solutions to protect instead of AD. In addition, GATT/WTO or preferential trade agreements conditions to raise AD are flexible and easy to interpret (Hansen & Prusa, 1995). There are many studies focus on impact of Antidumping on target countries site. (Prusa, 1994) find that the AD will push pressure on foreign firm to increase their prices in the first stage of process of petition’s tax.
(Cuyvers & Dumont, 2005) proves Asian export goods to EU are significant lower in both quantity and value after petition files. In addition, 74% of EC petition investigations lead to either tax rising or price undertaking in period 1981-2001. In addition, Antidumping is an outstanding case to study microeconomics issues and concepts (Blonigen & Prusa, 2001) such as: signaling, moral hazard, adverse selection, pricing theory, optimal tariff theory and practice, political economy of rent-seeking, comparative advantages. AD discriminates “named” and “non-named” countries in “named” products.
Thus, it might reduce comparative advantages of “named” firms while increase advantages of non-AD firms. Also, firms will adjust their price policy to adapt with tax rising. In addition, it is evident AD has effects on well-fare surplus. When government 2 TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail.com believes applying AD could benefit to producers, economists argued it lower consumer surplus as well.
For example, “non-AD” firms have ability to sell more even quality is lower than “AD” products. That is, government must have optimal tax for AD to keep balance between the two groups. Furthermore, effect of AD could be seen even as phase of announcement an investigation since it is such a “signaling” for exporter and importer to adjust their behaviors. For those reasons, there is a huge number of empirical researches refer to this.
For instance, (Brambilla, Porto, & Tarozzi, 2012) find the spillover effects of United States duties on catfish on Vietnamese household income.