Luận văn thạc sĩ về Quản lý Lợi nhuận qua Hoạt động Thực tế tại Việt Nam - Nguyễn Duy Anh, Đại ...

Nghiên cứu về quản lý thu nhập qua thao tác hoạt động thực tế tại Việt Nam, phân tích tác động và xu hướng hiện nay trong lĩnh vực tài chính.

Trường đại học

University of Economics

Chuyên ngành

Development Economics

Người đăng

Ẩn danh

Thể loại

Thesis

2016

96
0
0

Phí lưu trữ

35 Point

Mục lục chi tiết

DECLARATION

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

ABSTRACT

1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Problem statement

1.2. Research objective

1.3. Research questions

1.4. Structure of study

2. CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Definition of earnings management

List of Table and Figure

ABBREVIATION

Trích đoạn nội dung tài liệu

UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS ERASMUS UNVERSITY ROTTERDAM HO CHI MINH CITY INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL STUDIES VIETNAM THE NETHERLANDS VIETNAM – THE NETHERLANDS PROGRAMME FOR M.A IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS EARNINGS MANAGEMENT BY REAL ACTIVITIES MANIPULATION: A LOOK AT VIETNAM BY NGUYEN DUY ANH MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS HO CHI MINH CITY, November 2016 TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail.com UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL STUDIES HO CHI MINH CITY THE HAGUE VIETNAM THE NETHERLANDS VIETNAM - NETHERLANDS PROGRAMME FOR M.A IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS EARNINGS MANAGEMENT BY REAL ACTIVITIES MANIPULATIONS: A LOOK AT VIETNAM A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS By NGUYEN DUY ANH Academic Supervisor: Vu Viet Quang HO CHI MINH CITY, November 2016 TIEU LUAN MOI download : skknchat@gmail.com DECLARATION This is to certify that this thesis entitled “Earnings Management By Real Activities Manipulations: A Look At VietNam”, which is submitted by me in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Art in Development Economics to Viet Nam – The Netherlands Programme (VNP). To the best of my knowledge, my thesis does not infringe on anyone’s copyright nor violate any proprietary rights and that any ideas, techniques, quotation, or any other material from the work of other researchers in my thesis, published or otherwise, are fully acknowledge in accordance with the standard referencing practices. HCMC, November 30th, 2016 Nguyen Duy Anh TIEU LUAN MOI download i : skknchat@gmail.com ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Vu Viet Quang for his comprehensive guidance, great support and valuable advice he has given through my research study. I have been very lucky to a supervisor who took a high cared about my work and who respond to my question. He consistently allowed this paper to be my work but steered me in the right the direction whenever he thought I needed it. His careful editing contributed enormously to the production of this thesis. I also would like to thank my co-supervisor Dr. Truong Dang Thuy for his enthusiastic support, availability and constructive suggestion, which help me overcome the challenge and high- pressured situation during the time of research. I would like to express my gratitude to all lecturers of the Vietnam- Netherlands Program who have provided an interesting lesson to build my economic knowledge during this program. Besides, completing this work would have been difficult if it is not supported by my best friends. I am indebted to them for their help. Moreover, I wish to thank all my friends who are in VNP 21 who share unforgettable memories in this program. Finally, there are also words of deep gratitude for my family who support and encourage me when I implement my postgraduate studies. TIEU LUAN MOI download ii : skknchat@gmail.com ABSTRACT This research thesis tests three hypothesizes: (i) In Viet Nam, the listed companies that meet earnings target (zero earnings and zero earnings growth) exhibit the proof of real activities manipulation (ii) Hypothesis 2: there is the difference between the extent of using real activities manipulation of the listed firm that meet benchmark and those that meet earning benchmark and have a high value of an asset (iii) there is no relationship between firm using real activities manipulation to just meet earnings benchmark and future performance. Our tests were based on data included 2374 firm-year observation covering 2005 to 2015.We focus on companies that satisfy one of the criteria: zero earnings or zero earnings growth. The firms meet the criteria call suspected firms or belong to suspected firms group. The rules identify the firms that more likely to using real activities manipulation. We examine three types of real earnings management: (1) cutting discretionary expenditures (2) acceleration of timing of sales (sale manipulation) (3) reducing the cost of production. To measure real earnings management, we follow the cross-section model developed by Roychowdhury (2006), Gunny (2010); and estimate abnormal production cost, abnormal discretionary spending (sum of SG&A, R&D, and advertising) and abnormal CFO. Our finding is that Vietnamese listed firmed apply real activities management to meet earnings benchmark. Besides, the degree effect of cutting production cost of the suspected firms with a high value of assets is highest (11.14%) among three types of real activities management (2.54% for sale manipulation and 0.398% for reducing discretionary expenses, which suggest the firm with a good reputation prefer employ cutting production cost to meet companies target. Final, the companies which engage in CFO manipulation or cutting discretionary expenses, as real earnings management to just meet earnings benchmarks have no impact on subsequent performance. In contrast, the companies which engage in production cost as real earnings management to just meet earnings benchmarks have negative impact on subsequent performance. Keyword: Capital markets; Accounting choice; Earnings manipulation. TIEU LUAN MOI download iii : skknchat@gmail.com Table of Contents DECLARATION . Structure of study . Definition of earnings management . Real activities management definition . Models to detect the use of earnings management . Incentive to earnings management . Empirical research on real earnings management . Type of real earnings manipulation . Impact of real activity management on firm future performance . 26 METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION . 26 TIEU LUAN MOI download iv : skknchat@gmail. Selection of suspect firm-year . Real earnings proxies. Empirical model to test hypothesis 1 . Empirical model to test hypothesis 2 . Empirical model to test hypothesis 3 . 35 RESULTS AND DICUSSION . Selected suspected firm-year . Testing the assumptions of panel data regression . Empirical and discussion . Empirical evidence on the real activities manipulation of Companies listed in the Viet Nam stock market . Discussion about real activities manipulation . Size effect on real earnings management . The accociation between using real activites managmet to meet earnings benchmark and future performance . 55 CONCLUSION, CONTRIBUTION, AND LIMITATION . Limitation and further research . 63 TIEU LUAN MOI download v : skknchat@gmail.com List of Table and Figure List of Tables Table 1: Earnings management definition . 8 Table 2: Calculating abnormal accruals . 11 Table 3: Variable descriptions . 32 Table 4: Description statistics for sample firms in 2005-2015 period . 37 Table 5: Pearson Correlation matrix . 40 Table 6: Variance inflation factor . 41 Table 7: Comparison of suspect firm and the rest of sample . 45 Table 8: Capture net effect when firms combine one more type of real earnings management . 49 Table 9: Multivariate regression analyses of size effect on earnings management in Vietnam listed firms . 50 Table: 10 Regression between real activities and future performance. 53 List of Figure Figure 1: Framework for understanding the practice of Accounts Manipulation. 6 Figure 2: A hypothetical value function. 16 Figure 3: The losses have more impact on than an equivalent amount of gain. 17 Figure 4: The distribution of changes in net income divided by market value of equity at the beginning of the year. 18 Figure 5: histogram of distribution of net income scaled by lagged total assets (Figure 5A) and histogram of distribution of change in net income scaled by lagged total assets (Figure 5B) . 35 Figure 6: Comparing mean of the suspect firm group (include observation of firm with zero earnings and firm with zero earnings growth) and men of the rest of sample. 39 TIEU LUAN MOI download vi : skknchat@gmail.com ABBREVIATION RM Real management REM Real earnings management TIEU LUAN MOI download vii : skknchat@gmail.com CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1. Problem statement With the explosion of the Dot-Com bubble in 2000, the previous stock which used to be bullish now became going down. Then, in the end, the awful reality kept up with the firms which were supposed to try to hide the unpleasant truth in their financial reports. The beginning of the long list big scandal happened in 2000 when Xerox admitted that over a four year – period, their income had been overstated by US$1. They boosted their income by reported revenue from the lease of printers and copier in the long-term too early. Unfortunately, it was not an isolated example. Enron Corporation uses a special purpose accounting entities which help them hide billion dollars worth of debt away its balance sheet. WorldCom employed a simple scheme to change more than US$ 11 billion of cost to assets. Tyco International executives were accused of covering million US dollar debt, which they borrowed from employees with interest – free or very low-interest loans and do not disclose these loans. After investigation of the U. Securities and Exchange Commission, Quest Communication was forced to adjust their profit by US $2.4 billion because Quest Communication reported impressive income from the transaction is booked as revenue without receiving money. The series of financial accounting scandal still goes on. As a result of the scandals, the collapse of cooperation lead to hundreds of billion dollars in loss for investors, thousand job losses. The collapse of WorldCom in May 2002 is the biggest, with approximately US $180 billion in the loss and also 30. Besides financial accounting scandals, it also highlights the failures to audit financial statement correctly. For example, Arthur Andersen LLP, which was one member of Big 5 accounting firm in the world, prepared Enron’s financial report. Andersen also collapses after Enron scandal. According to the Securities and Exchange Commission investigation, firstly, Andersen found out many “trouble” transactions which were highly risky, but Andersen audit firm received a million fees, so Andersen did not give their opinion of these risk. Further, Andersen ordered their company’s Houston office destroy a thousand of the document to prevent Securities and Exchange Commission from investigating Enron’s bankruptcy. These Arthur Andersen scandals reduce the faith of investor in the integrity of the audit firm. After all, United States of America enacted Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July 2002 to improve the business environment and protect investors. TIEU LUAN MOI download 1 : skknchat@gmail.com The new environment force academics, regulator, and practitioners concern with companies ‘earnings management to protect investment and control capital market efficiency. There are two reasons why we should study earnings management. Firstly, more research on earnings management, more suggestion for improvement (Ronen, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c). The others try to understand the earnings management phenomenon (Ronen and Yaari, 2007). According to Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew (2006), if we can understand clearly why earnings management occur, and how it is created, we can effectively prevent futures happening. Accounting research shows that not all earnings management is wrong. Therefore, each type of earnings management, we can take an active action to avoid this risk. Schipper (1989) defines: “Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.” In another word, somebody is acting something which effects negatively on someone else. For example, to evaluate firm’s credibility; financial health and viability; creditors apply the numbers reported (Ge, 2010). In turn, among other indicators, investors use earnings to monitor operational performance. Nevertheless, their conclusions on a given number reported could be incorrect if they are unable to recognize and adapt to the impacts of earnings management which is hiding in the financial statements. This distortion will become apparent in future results when the firm’s performance does not match their evaluations. Accruals manipulation does not involve by altering operating activities of the firm, but through selecting the relevant accounting system to meet desired goals. On the other hand, real earning management is the action of managers to reach their objective by changing real firm operations such as decline research & development cost; decreasing selling, general and administrative outlays; sales promotion. These two types of earnings management are tools for managers to increase/decrease revenues; nevertheless, one form has an effect on real activities, and the other form does not involve in operation.

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