Western University Scholarship@Western Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 8-4-2021 1:00 PM The 1980 Moscow Olympic Boycott as a Tool of American Foreign Policy Andrew Rice, The University of Western Ontario Supervisor: Sendzikas, Aldona, The University of Western Ontario Co-Supervisor: Barney, Robert K., The University of Western Ontario A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts degree in History © Andrew Rice 2021 Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.ca/etd Part of the Canadian History Commons, Other American Studies Commons, Political History Commons, and the United States History Commons Recommended Citation Rice, Andrew, "The 1980 Moscow Olympic Boycott as a Tool of American Foreign Policy" (2021). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository.ca/etd/7998 This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact wlswadmin@uwo.
ii Abstract The purpose of this thesis is to explore the American-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics as a tool of American foreign policy. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 which prompted US President Jimmy Carter to impose sanctions on the Soviets, including a boycott of the Moscow Games. The thesis examines why the boycott failed to achieve Carter’s objectives and evaluates what the President may have considered to substantially increase its success. Carter’s dealings with essential groups within the Olympic movement, such as the United States Olympic Committee (USOC), International Olympic Committee (IOC), and the Olympic athletes, as well as foreign leaders, will be critically evaluated.
The thesis argues that Carter failed at convincing these essential groups to support a boycott and offers some thoughts as to what the President might have considered to increase his chance of success. The thesis concludes by critically evaluating how Carter sought to promote the boycott and offers an analysis on the effectiveness of using the Olympics to advance a nation’s foreign policy agenda. Summary for Lay Audience This thesis explores the reaction of US President Jimmy Carter to the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. It focuses on examining the US-led boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow.
The paper argues that Carter failed to meet the objectives the boycott hoped to achieve and offers some thoughts as to what the President may have considered to increase its chance of success. Keywords Olympic Games, International Olympic Committee, United States Olympic Committee, Olympic boycott, United States, Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Jimmy Carter, US foreign policy iii Acknowledgements The completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the help and support of my supervisors, colleagues, friends and family. Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisors, Dr Aldona Sendzikas and Dr. Sendzikas’ Cold War seminar piqued my interest in American foreign policy during this period.
She graciously agreed to supervise my project, assisting me in selecting a topic, keeping me on-task throughout the process, reading drafts and providing me with important feedback. A long-time family friend, Dr. Barney has always encouraged and assisted me in my academic pursuits. It was an honour to be able to work with him.
He provided invaluable knowledge on everything related to Olympic affairs. I would also like to thank my second reader, Dr. Marta Dyczok, who provided me with helpful suggestions and edits that greatly improved my thesis. Additionally, a thank you goes to the entire History Department, in particular Kara Brown for her support and assistance throughout my entire two years in the History program.
I would like to thank my colleagues and friends that I met during the MA program. Sharing an office with you all and hanging out outside of campus made my MA experience one to remember and provided an oft-needed break from the grind and stress that invariably comes with graduate school. Most importantly, I would like to thank my family. My Mom, Dad and Aunt Cindy supported me throughout the project, reading drafts, catching typos and providing suggestions that greatly improved the quality of the thesis.
Finally, I would like to thank my late grandfather for his encouragement to pursue higher education and financial assistance throughout my university career. iv Table of Contents Abstract, Summary for Lay Audience, Keywords ii Acknowledgements iii Table of Contents iv Chapter 1: Introduction 1 Chapter 2: Background Information 5 2.1 The Structure and Background of the Olympics 5 2.2 The Berlin Summer Games of 1936 7 2.3 American Foreign Policy and Détente in the 1970s 15 Chapter 3: The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the US Response 22 3.1 The Soviets Invade Afghanistan 22 3.2 Initial US Sanctions 24 3.3 The Olympic Boycott Debate 27 3.4 Carter Announces the Boycott 34 3.5 Evaluation of the Boycott Decision 39 Chapter 4: Domestic Problems – Congress, the USOC and the Athletes 44 4.1 The Boycott Debate in Congress 44 4.2 The USOC Testimonies in Congress 56 4.3 The Lake Placid Olympics 66 4.4 The USOC Decision 70 4.5 The Olympic Athletes Respond 73 Chapter 5: Foreign Problems – Canada and the Global Boycott Campaign 83 5.1 Human Rights and Europe 83 5.2 The Developing World 88 5.3 Canada Joins the Boycott 92 Chapter 6: Conclusion 104 Bibliography 113 Curriculum Vitae 121 1 Chapter 1: Introduction “My opinion of the Russians has changed most drastically in the last week [more] than even in the previous two and a half years before that.”1 – Jimmy Carter, December 1979 On December 24, 1979, Leonid Brezhnev, leader of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), launched an invasion of Afghanistan. A few days later, Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America (US) from 1977-1981, announced that his opinion of the Soviet Union had drastically changed. From 1947 to 1991, the US and the USSR were engaged in the Cold War; a geopolitical, economic and ideological rivalry between two superpowers and their respective allies and client states.
The invasion of Afghanistan marked one of the turning points of the Cold War. Though the 1970s marked a period of relative understanding and cooperation between the Americans and the Soviets, the invasion of Afghanistan dramatically changed Carter’s impressions of the Soviet Union, causing the President to react strongly and pursue a foreign policy that was more combative and interventionist compared with US policy throughout the 1970s. Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan, President from 1981 to 1989, engaged in a “second” Cold War with the Soviet Union. Throughout his first term in office, Reagan expanded the adverse and contentious policies adopted by Carter in 1980.
The most controversial American response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was Carter’s decision to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics held from July 19 to August 3, in Moscow. Carter interpreted the invasion as a major divergence of Brezhnev’s foreign policy and was concerned about the prospects of further Soviet expansion in the Middle East. A boycott of 1 Nancy Mitchell, “The Cold War and Jimmy Carter,” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume III: Endings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 84.
2 the Olympics was a sanction levied to punish the Soviets, force them to withdraw their troops, prevent them from achieving a propaganda victory, provide a deterrent for future aggression and contribute to America’s long-term goals in the Middle East. The purpose of this thesis is to explore the American-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics as a tool of American foreign policy. The Olympic boycott was supported by President Carter, the US Congress and the American people but was unsuccessful at preventing the Games from being held in Moscow. Unlike traditional foreign policy prescriptions, the Olympic boycott necessitated cooperation among several nonstate actors, as well as support from the nations of the world to be successful.
Thus, Carter needed to convince the Olympic movement and foreign countries to support American foreign policy by agreeing to boycott the Moscow Games. The thesis will answer the question as to why the boycott failed and what might have been done differently to increase its chances of succeeding. President Carter’s dealings with essential groups within the Olympic movement, such as the United States Olympic Committee (USOC), International Olympic Committee (IOC), and the Olympic athletes, as well as foreign leaders, will be critically evaluated. The paper argues that Carter failed at convincing these essential groups to support the boycott and offers some thoughts as to what the President might have done differently that may have increased his chances of success.
The paper concludes that while an Olympic boycott was always going to be a challenge to achieve, Carter might have considered approaching the boycott differently. This thesis will begin by discussing the structure and background of the Olympics, emphasizing the autonomy of the Olympic movement in all matters related to the Games. The history of Olympic boycotts will be explored; in particular, the failed boycott of the 1936 Berlin Games, which, before 1980, was the only edition of the Games that the US considered 3 boycotting. The Cold War expanded the importance of the Olympics for the Americans and Soviets beginning in the 1950s, a period of the conflict that was defined by an escalation of tensions between the two superpowers.
By the 1970s, however, an era of détente had replaced the contentious period of the early Cold War. American foreign policy in the 1970s will be discussed, providing important background information on the state of US-Soviet relations before the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Chapter Two describes Carter’s response to the invasion, emphasizing the most punitive sanction imposed by the US on the Soviet Union, the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. Carter and his inner circle deliberated the details and merits of the boycott early in the new year, announcing their decision on January 20.
There were several disagreements surrounding the terms of the boycott among Carter’s inner circle and US intelligence. It was decided that the terms of the boycott would include an ultimatum imposed on the Soviet Union that if it did not withdraw its troops from Afghanistan within one month, the US would boycott the Games and encourage other nations to follow. The chapter analyzes Carter’s boycott announcement, noting that the rationales the President provided for imposing the boycott varied across different platforms, encompassing both short- and long-term US foreign policy goals. The chapter concludes by evaluating the decision, offering a critique of how Carter approached the boycott.
The third chapter explores Carter’s domestic efforts to garner support for the Olympic boycott. The boycott was debated in the US Congress and although it was widely endorsed in both the House of Representatives and the Senate, several of Carter’s rationales were questioned. The chapter also evaluates Carter’s dealings with the IOC, USOC and American Olympic athletes. It argues that the President did not respect the autonomy of the Olympic movement which damaged Carter’s reputation among these essential groups that he required cooperation 4 with for the boycott to have a chance of success.
Indeed, there was a backlash against Carter from the IOC, USOC and Olympic athletes because Carter failed to understand that the Games did not belong to the US, as he attempted to inject American foreign policy interests into the Olympic movement that were clearly against the politicization of the Games. Chapter Four examines Carter’s foreign campaign aimed at convincing the nations of the world to support the American-led boycott. It examines Carter’s unsuccessful attempt at constructing a coalition of boycotting nations in Europe and analyzes how Carter may have better approached dealing with his European allies. Beyond US allies in Europe, Carter’s campaign to convince developing nations in the Global South to support the boycott is discussed.
The final section of the chapter explores Canada’s response to calls from the US to support the boycott and explains how and why Canada chose to support its ally by abstaining from Moscow.