Churchill, America and Vietnam, 1941–45 T. Smith Tai Lieu Chat Luong Churchill, America and Vietnam, 1941–45 Also by T. Smith BRITAIN AND THE ORIGINS OF THE VIETNAM WAR: UK POLICY IN INDO-CHINA 1943–50 Churchill, America and Vietnam, 1941–45 T. Smith Associate Professor of History, Huntington University, USA © T.
Smith 2011 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, Saffron House, 6-10 Kirby Street, London EC1N 8TS. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.
The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2011 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Palgrave Macmillan in the UK is an imprint of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan in the US is a division of St Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Smith, T. Churchill, America and Vietnam, 1941–45 / T. Includes bibliographical references and index. Great Britain—Foreign relations—Indochina.
Indochina—Foreign relations—Great Britain. Great Britain—Foreign relations—United States. United States—Foreign relations—Great Britain. Great Britain—Foreign relations—1936–1945.
Vietnam War, 1961–1975— Causes.53 597—dc23 2011021393 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne For Elizabeth Anne Smith ‘Many women do noble things, but you surpass them all’. Proverbs 31:29 This page intentionally left blank Contents Acknowledgements viii List of Abbreviations x Introduction 1 1 Churchill’s Conundrum 6 America, Roosevelt and anti-colonialism 7 The Atlantic Charter, Washington and Casablanca 11 2 Churchill’s Conceit 26 Washington and Quebec 27 Cairo and Tehran 39 3 Churchill’s Isolation 48 London 49 Quebec and Cairo 64 4 Churchill’s Realignment 75 Malta and Yalta 75 Vietnam 87 San Francisco and Potsdam 96 5 Trusteeship’s Denouement 106 Resolution 107 A lost opportunity 116 Epilogue 125 Conclusion 130 Select Chronology 136 Select Personalia 138 Notes 141 Bibliography 166 Index 178 vii Acknowledgements In the course of researching and writing this volume I have incurred a number of debts which it is my pleasure to acknowledge. To all of the individuals and institutions cited here I would like to express an immense debt of gratitude, although the usual disclaimer applies that none bears any responsibility for the author’s conclusions. I am greatly indebted to Professor John Charmley, with whom many years ago I first discussed the idea of a book about the relationship between Churchill, America and Vietnam.
Despite fierce competition for his time, he indulged me with advice and the opportunity to share ideas. Likewise I am immensely grateful to my dear friend Dr Larry Butler, not only for his helpful observations and encouragement during the evo- lution of this project but also for reading and commenting on large portions of the typescript. As the bibliography reflects, I am obliged to many scholars for their previous research in similar fields. However, I am especially thankful to those scholars that have taken a personal interest in this project and been unsparing with their time when needed.
To this end I am most grateful to Professor Ben Kiernan, Dr Thomas Otte, Dr David Roberts and Professor Martin Thomas. Likewise, I am indebted to my colleagues in the History Department at Huntington University – Professor Dwight Brautigam, Professor Paul Michelson and Professor Jeffrey Webb – for providing the conditions in which serious historical research can thrive and with whom I have had the opportunity to debate and share many ideas over several years. Equally, I am also grateful to my late teacher, Professor Ralph Smith, whose own pioneering research and generous support have been of great significance. The history students at Huntington University also deserve special mention – especially those who over the last few years have taken my senior seminar ‘Britain and the End of Empire’ or an independent study.
Their attitude of not taking anything that I have said for granted has been an immense source of encouragement and pleasure. I owe a special debt to the staff, trustees and individual copyright holders of the following libraries and archives: The Cadbury Research Library, Birmingham University; the British Library; the Centre for the Archives of France Overseas, Aix en Provence; Churchill College, viii Acknowledgements ix Cambridge; the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York; the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri; Huntington Uni- versity Library; the Middle East Centre Archive, St Anthony’s College, Oxford; the Mountbatten Archive, Southampton University Library; the National Archives, Public Record Office, London; the University of East Anglia Library.
If I have inadvertently infringed any copyright, I trust that the owner will notify the publisher so that this may be corrected in any future editions. I would also like to thank Mr Philip Judge, of the School of Environmental Sciences at the University of East Anglia, for drawing the map of Southeast Asia. I am indebted to the Lilly Foundation for funding my Huntington University Research Fellowship in 2010, thereby providing a signifi- cant teaching load reduction towards my research. Likewise Dr Norris Friesen, Academic Dean of Huntington University, generously provided additional financial assistance towards my study.
My publisher Michael Strang and his assistant Ruth Ireland have, yet again, demonstrated aid beyond the call of duty and have shown exemplary patience, understanding and support for which I am very grateful. Finally, I must thank my family who have contributed through their encouragement to this study. The constant love, advice and support of my parents, Victor and Joan Smith, and my brother and his wife, Thomas and Helen Lyman Smith, have been invaluable. However, my greatest debt is to my wife Elizabeth, who has lived with this project from the beginning and who has accompanied me on many of the research trips.
It is more than convention which makes me say that with- out her I could never have written this tome. Therefore, as a small token of thanks, this book is dedicated to her. Smith List of Abbreviations CCS Combined Chiefs of Staff COS Chiefs of Staff (British) JIC Joint Intelligence Committee JSM Joint Service Mission (Washington) PM Prime Minister SEAC Southeast Asia Command SOE Special Operations Executive UN United Nations x xi Map of Southeast Asia This page intentionally left blank Introduction In the beginning was the word, and the word was Churchill’s and he pronounced it good.1 Since its inception during the Second World War, the Anglo-American special relationship has remained a central feature of contempo- rary British foreign policy. Moreover it has been personified by its chief architect – Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill.
The strength of Churchill’s enchantment was to create a platform whereby subsequent generations of Britons regarded the special relationship with increas- ing fondness and in ever more monolithic terms. Yet – as successive historians have argued – the special relationship that Churchill sought to construct, with the American President Franklin D. Roosevelt, was neither monolithic nor harmonious. After all, American and British war aims were very different; nowhere was this more evident than in the Allied high-policy debate towards French Indo-China – modern Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.
The initial stages of Britain’s association with French Indo-China were orchestrated neither by Britain, nor France, nor Vietnam, but by the United States. Britain owed its entanglement in the affairs of this French colony to the musings of Roosevelt. Hitherto British high-policy debate had been far less concerned with Indo-Chinese affairs. But in the confines of Washington, Roosevelt had developed the notion that he would like to detach Indo-China from French colonial control and to place Indo-China into some form of post-war trusteeship.
Although this was not a plan for immediate autonomy, this trusteeship scheme would evolve and the Indo-Chinese people would move towards sus- tainable independence. Roosevelt did not care about the finer details of his endeavour: one example being that Indo-China was a French 1 2 Churchill, America and Vietnam, 1941–45 colonial possession rather than American and therefore not his to dispose. Roosevelt’s war aims did not envisage the restoration of the European balance of power or the old world colonial order. He saw it as one of his primary objectives to fashion a new ‘international order based on harmony’.2 The management of this new system would naturally be in the hands of the American President.
Trusteeship was a dangerous concept. It set a perilous precedent for decolonisation. Roosevelt’s open advocacy of Indo-Chinese trusteeship demonstrated the vehemence of his faith in national self-determination. This was an important anti-colonial ‘test case’ by an ardent anti- imperialist who had once quipped to Churchill that ‘the British would take land anywhere in the world even if it were only a rock or a sand bar’.3 Roosevelt was not beyond using other nations to foster his trusteeship ideals.
Indeed trusteeship occupied a special place in Sino-American rela- tions, because Roosevelt visualised Nationalist China as being one of the four world policemen – with Britain, Russia and the United States – bound to protect post-war harmony and security.4 Britain feared the rise of China as a Great Power. A strong China – backed by the United States – could exert undue pressure upon British colonial possessions in the Far East. Likewise, Britain doubted the lucidity of Chinese intentions for Southeast Asia, especially as a potential trustee.5 Churchill naturally sought to defend the future of the British Empire. When trusteeship discussions touched upon British possessions he advo- cated a strong anti-trusteeship line.
This was shared by many members of Britain’s coalition government and across the British political divide. For example, the Labour Home Secretary, Herbert Morrison, stated that trusteeship ‘would be like giving a child of ten a latch-key, a bank account and a shotgun’.6 Nevertheless, when trusteeship deliberations focused upon other nations’ imperial spheres, Churchill was short-sighted and absent- minded. While Whitehall attempted to develop a unified British pol- icy towards Indo-Chinese trusteeship, Churchill continually rebuffed any actions that could potentially result in a conflict with Roosevelt and thereby produce a rift in the Anglo-American special relation- ship. Therefore, from the outset Churchill chose to regard Roosevelt’s policy of trusteeship for Indo-China as ‘an aberration’.
As Churchill’s ‘instinct’ was the prevailing factor in British wartime policy, he pre- vented Whitehall and the Dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa from developing a more unified and co-ordinated approach.7 Ultimately, as the war progressed and Churchill became Introduction 3 more concerned about his legacy, he gradually turned his attention towards Indo-China and resolved his split with the rest of the British establishment and the Dominions. If the Foreign Office had directed British Indo-China policy from the beginning, then Anglo-American diplomacy would have definitely been more belligerent and the spe- cial relationship would have been developed in a more robust climate. For that reason Churchill saw it as his duty to step warily. He believed that he alone could be the pivot of Anglo-American relations.