Understanding China’s Behaviour in the South China Sea A Defensive Realist Perspective KLAUS HEINRICH RADITIO Tai Lieu Chat Luong Understanding China’s Behaviour in the South China Sea Klaus Heinrich Raditio Understanding China’s Behaviour in the South China Sea A Defensive Realist Perspective Klaus Heinrich Raditio University of Sydney Sydney, NSW, Australia ISBN 978-981-13-1282-3 ISBN 978-981-13-1283-0 (eBook) https://doi.1007/978-981-13-1283-0 Library of Congress Control Number: 2018950397 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
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The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore For Indonesia Foreword Albert Einstein once said that “peace can only be achieved by understand- ing”. In a world full of suspicion and distrust, his word is very relevant. Our knowledge and understanding on other countries, particularly the emerging power like China, are indeed of paramount importance. For some, the rise of China offers plenty of opportunities, and success awaits those who can take advantage of it.
However, for others, China is still a mystery. Its behaviour in the South China Sea, for instance, is perplex- ing—and sometimes considered worrying. This book—which offers the perspective of defensive realist—is meant to deepen our understanding on China and its behaviour in the South China Sea. This fruitful research serves Indonesia’s diplomacy which con- sistently promotes inclusiveness and habit of dialogue.
Indonesia’s foreign policy aims at alleviating great powers rivalry, maintaining peace, stability, and prosperity. This research was successfully conducted and wins acclaim from promi- nent scholars in international relations. I congratulate Klaus for presenting his original idea on China’s behaviour in the South China Sea. I am con- fident that this book contributes to enhancing our understanding on China and the current stage of international affairs.
Director General for Asia-Pacific and African Desra Percaya Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jakarta Republic of Indonesia vii Preface I have conducted this research under the Australia Awards Scholarship (AAS) scheme. I dedicate this research to my country and hope this research can help everyone, especially my fellow Indonesians and Australian friends, to understand China better. This research is conducted with generous support from my principal supervisor Associate Professor Jingdong Yuan and associate supervisor Dr Justin Hastings. I am grateful also for support from the staff and col- leagues at the University of Sydney’s Department of Government and International Relations.
I would also like to thank the National Institute of South China Sea Studies in Haikou, China, and the Centre for International Law, National University of Singapore, where I conducted my fieldwork in November and December 2015. My deepest appreciation goes to the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Indonesia to which I belong, for giving me the opportunity to serve my country in the scholarly field. I thank the Indonesian Consulate in Sydney and all the staff for their support and care while I have been undertaking this research, in particular Mr and Mrs Yayan Mulyana, and Mr Novan Ivanhoe Saleh. I thank Dr Desra Percaya, the Director General for Asia-Pacific and African Affairs, for giving me the opportunities to develop my skill in diplomacy and scholarly field.
I am most grateful for my colleagues’ sup- port, particularly Yvonne Mewengkang, Rifky Akbar, Raka Pamungkas, Gina Virginianty, Diah Setyorini, and Junaedi. ix x PREFACE This research could not have been completed without moral support from my family, who created a positive atmosphere and helped me to be a better person. Ad Maiorem Dei Gloriam! Sydney, NSW, Australia Klaus Heinrich Raditio April 2018 Contents 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Is the Nature of China’s SCS Behaviour Changing? 3 1.2 The Rationale for China’s Changing Behaviour in the SCS 8 1.1 Contribution 1: Theoretical Analysis 12 1.2 Contribution 2: Systematic Explanation 12 1.5 The Structure of the Book 14 2 Theoretical Framework: Security Dilemma Reconsidered 19 2.1 Security Dilemma: The Concept 19 2.2 The Root of the Security Dilemma 22 2.3 Security Dilemma: The Constitutive Elements 24 2.4 The Actors within the Security Dilemma 26 2.5 Security Dilemma, Spiral, and Deterrence 29 2.6 Are There Variants of Security Dilemmas? 32 2.7 Security Dilemma and Conflict of Interest 34 2.8 The Continuum of the Security Dilemma 37 2.9 Can a Security Dilemma Be Mitigated? 41 xi xii Contents 3 China’s Claim in the South China Sea 49 3.1 China’s Claim in the SCS 49 3.2 China’s Claim and Its Compatibility with International Law 52 3.3 The UNCLOS Tribunal Ruling 60 3.1 The Arbitration Process 60 3.2 The Award of the Tribunal 61 3.4 Conclusion 63 4 China’s Interests in the South China Sea 69 4.1 China’s Growing Interests in the SCS 69 4.5 The Legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party 83 4.2 Conclusion: In Defence of China’s Interest in SCS 86 5 China’s Defection in the South China Sea 95 5.1 China as a Defensive Realist State 95 5.2 The SCS as a Litmus Test for China’s Defensive Realist Behaviour 97 5.3 Brief History of Conflict in the SCS100 5.4 Does China’s Behaviour in the SCS Reflect that of a Defensive Realist State?105 5.1 Is China Open to Non-military Solutions for the SCS Dispute?105 5.2 Does China Show Self-restraint in the SCS?107 5.3 Does China Adopt Reassurance Policies in the SCS?110 5.5 China’s Defection in the SCS112 5.6 Conclusion116 6 Security Dilemma Between China and Other South China Sea Claimant States 125 6.2 The Elements of the Security Dilemma in the SCS127 Contents xiii 6.3 Conflict of Interest130 6.4 The Continuum of the Security Dilemma132 6.5 The Rationale of China’s Defection in the SCS137 6.6 How Can China Mitigate the Security Dilemma?144 7 Security Dilemma Between China vis-à-vis the United States of America in the South China Sea 153 7.1 The Elements of a Security Dilemma154 7.2 Conflict of Interests160 7.2 China’s Rise and the US’ Global Position162 7.3 The Asymmetrical Interests Between Two Great Powers in the Asian Context165 7.3 The Continuum of Security Dilemma166 7.4 How Far Can China Go?171 7.5 The Future of Sino-US Rivalry in the SCS174 8 Conclusion 185 8.1 Summary of the Research Findings185 8.2 Significance for Theory and Policy188 Appendix A: Chinese Nota Verbale (CML/17/2009) to the UN Secretary General, 7 May 2009 191 Appendix B: Diplomatic Note from Pham Van Dong to Zhou Enlai (14 September 1958) 193 Appendix C: “Philippines v. China Arbitration Case: Summary of the Philippines Submissions and Tribunal Awards” 197 Index 205 Abbreviations ADIZ Air Defence Identification Zone ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ASEAN Association of the Southeast Asian Nations CCP Chinese Communist Party CMS China Marine Surveillance CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Cooperation DoC Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam ECS East China Sea EDCA Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone FONOP Freedom of Navigation Operation ICC International Criminal Court ICJ International Court of Justice ITLOS International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea JMSU Joint Marine Surveillance Undertaking LSG Leading Small Group NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization OBOR One Belt One Road PCA Permanent Court of Arbitration PLA People’s Liberation Army PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy PRC People’s Republic of China RIMPAC Rim of the Pacific Exercise ROC Republic of China RVN Republic of Vietnam SCS South China Sea xv xvi ABBREVIATIONS SRV Socialist Republic of Vietnam TAC ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defence UNCLCS United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea List of Figures Fig.1 The continuum of the security dilemma process (modified from Tang, A Theory of Security Strategies for Our Time: Defensive Realism, 2010, p.2 Kydd’s (2005) spiral equilibrium 41 Fig.1 The Paracel Islands—depicted by M.1 The first and second island chains as depicted by A.
Maramis 79 xvii List of Tables Table 1.1 The events that signify China’s changing behaviour 4 Table 2.1 Offensive and defensive realist states in brief 29 Table 2.2 Countries with which China has a security dilemma 36 Table 5.1 China’s actions in the SCS and their significance 116 Table 6.1 Source of the activation of the security dilemma in the SCS 134 Table 7.1 The differences between the two security dilemmas 167 Table 7.2 Sources of the activation of the security dilemma between China and the US 168 xix CHAPTER 1 Introduction 1.1 Background The dispute over the South China Sea (SCS) is one of the hottest territorial and jurisdictional disputes in modern history. This resources-rich area is claimed by China and four other countries in the Southeast Asian region (Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei), and by Taiwan. There have been numerous incidents in the SCS since the mid-1970s. In most of the high-profile incidents—such as the 1974 Paracel Islands incidents, the 1988 Johnson Reef incidents, the 1995 Mischief Reef incidents, and the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incidents—they have all involved China vis-à-vis other claimant states.
Neither the incidents among non-China claimant states themselves receive high-profile coverage nor are they considered sig- nificant. China’s behaviour has been at the centre of gravity with regard to stability in the region. This might be because China is the latecomer in establishing a presence in the SCS, especially in the Spratlys, regardless of the fact that its claim dates back to a time before the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. This research’s primary interest is to analyse the nature of China’s SCS behaviour, its rationale, and development that has led to its defection in the early part of the twenty-first century.
Prior to the recent tension, China’s behaviour in the Southeast Asian region was described as relatively self-restrained, accommodating, and reassuring. Ralf Emmers describes this period as one of de-escalation which lasted from the aftermath of the 1995 Mischief Reef incident to between 2007 and 2009.1 During this period of de-escalation, however, © The Author(s) 2019 1 K. Raditio, Understanding China’s Behaviour in the South China Sea, https://doi. RADITIO the situation in the SCS was not completely free of conflict.
Some skir- mishes between maritime law enforcement ships and fishing boats from China and other claimants did take place, but overall, the disputes were low profile and no dramatic tension occurred.2 Until the late 1990s, the SCS tension was reduced, and the parties concerned seemed content to keep the status quo.3 China itself became more open to discussing the SCS issue in the context of ASEAN.4 The friction among the claimant states was reduced in the early 2000s because of China’s adoption of a reassur- ance policy towards its ASEAN counterparts—stressing the peaceful nature of its ascent.5 China realised that without regional stability, devel- opment and modernisation of the country would be hard to attain. This reassurance policy towards ASEAN was adopted as the good neighbour (mulin waijiao wending zhoubian) guideline gained prominence in Chinese foreign policy.6 This conducive situation contributed to the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) in November 2002.