University of Central Florida STARS Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 2010 The Highland Soldier In Georgia And Florida: A Case Study Of Scottish Highlanders In British Military Service, 1739-1748 Scott Hilderbrandt University of Central Florida Part of the History Commons Find similar works at: https://stars.edu/etd University of Central Florida Libraries http://library.edu This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019 by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact STARS@ucf. STARS Citation Hilderbrandt, Scott, "The Highland Soldier In Georgia And Florida: A Case Study Of Scottish Highlanders In British Military Service, 1739-1748" (2010).
Electronic Theses and Dissertations, 2004-2019.edu/etd/4375 THE HIGHLAND SOLDIER IN GEORGIA AND FLORIDA: A CASE STUDY OF SCOTTISH HIGHLANDERS IN BRITISH MILITARY SERVICE, 1739-1748 by SCOTT ANDREW HILDERBRANDT B. University of Central Florida, 2007 A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of History in the College of Arts and Humanities at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida Spring Term 2010 ABSTRACT This study examined Scottish Highlanders who defended the southern border of British territory in the North American theater of the War of the Austrian Succession (1739-1748). A framework was established to show how Highlanders were deployed by the English between 1745 and 1815 as a way of eradicating radical Jacobite elements from the Scottish Highlands and utilizing their supposed natural superiority in combat. The case study of these Highlanders who fought in Georgia and Florida demonstrated that the English were already employing Highlanders in a similar fashion in North America during the 1730s and 1740s.
British government sources and correspondence of colonial officials and military officers were used to find the common Highlander’s reactions to fighting on this particular frontier of the Empire. It was discovered that by reading against what these officials wrote and said was the voice of the Highlander found, in addition to confirming a period of misrepresentation of Highland manpower in the colony of Georgia during the War of Jenkins’ Ear that adhered to the analytical framework established. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION. 16 CHAPTER 2: THE TRANSITION PERIOD, 1745-1815.
26 The Black Watch at Fort Carillon, 1758. 32 The Relief of Fort Pitt: The Battle of Bushy Run, 1763. 35 The Peninsular Campaign. 38 The Battle of New Orleans.
43 Opinion of Highlanders: Perspectives from English Generals and Politicians. 50 CHAPTER 3: SCOTTISH HIGHLANDERS DURING THE WAR OF JENKINS’ EAR. 54 Outbreak of War. 64 Ambush at Fort Mosa.
72 The Spanish Invasion of Georgia. 75 Conclusion of the War. 83 LIST OF REFERENCES. 95 iii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS CGHS Collections of the Georgia Historical Society, 20 Vols.
Savannah: Georgia Historical Society, 1840-. The Colonial Records of the of South Carolina. Journal of the Commons House of Assembly, from the 1st Day of December, 1741 to the 8th Day of March, 1742. Columbia: The Historical Commission of South Carolina, 1953.
CRSG Candler, Alan D. The Colonial Records of the State of Georgia, 32 Vols. Atlanta and Athens: various publishers, 1904-1916, 1976-. iv INTRODUCTION There can be no mistaking the integral role Scotland has played in the British armed services.
Scots contributed significantly – whether in manpower for the army or building valuable ports for the Royal Navy – to the military of Great Britain. Historians who have written on this subject generally concur that the impact of Scots in the British armed forces was beneficial and seen in many ways, including the solidification of relations between the nations of Great Britain. By fighting a common enemy together, i., France, it was thought that the Scots, in particular the Highlanders, lost their Jacobite tendencies (which France supported) and became fully integrated into the British nation. However, when one looks back at the primary source material available from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a somewhat different picture begins to appear.
While the complete inclusion of all of Scotland into the British military did have a positive effect for Great Britain, the actual experiences of Scottish soldiers tell a different story. Reviewing the military history of Great Britain from this period shows how the English took advantage of the new pool of manpower found in Scotland after the ’Forty-Five in their campaigns against their old enemy, France. Britons may not have completely come together and fought a common enemy, as some historians claimed. Scottish Highlanders were coerced into service of Great Britain through conscious means by the English for the expansion and consolidation of the British Empire.
The Highlanders who colonized Georgia in the 1730s were 1 part of the martial misappropriation that occurred throughout the eighteenth century in the British military in part due to the stereotypical notion of the Highlander as suited for the military colonization demanded in Georgia. Background In the years leading up to parliamentary union, the relationship between Scotland and England was tense at best. 1 Since the Union of Crowns in 1603, there was much debate on how each country could better from the other. Scotland wanted more share in foreign matters, particularly trade in newly-acquired territory.
2 James VI and I, the first ruler of a united Scotland and England under one monarchy, even desired to politically unite the two countries under one government, each country being equally represented in one parliament. 3 The English, however, were not as keen to allow more Scottish involvement in imperial matters, and abhorred the idea of complete union between the two nations. 4 With the triumph of William of Orange (William III) over the House of Stuart and his ascendance to the throne, there was a sharp increase in mutual hatred and distrust between Scotland and England. 5 However, according to Christopher Whatley and Derek Patrick, the foundation for parliamentary union in 1707 was laid two decades before when Scottish 1 Murray G.
Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 28; Christopher A. Whatley and Derek J. Patrick, The Scots and the Union (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 3.
Smout, “Introduction,” in Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1603-1900: Proceedings of The British Academy, vol. Smout (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3; Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 56- 58. 4 Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 4-5. 2 politicians began talks with William of Orange concerning the new king’s ascension to the Scottish throne in 1688.
6 The English resented these negotiations, and continued to dominate the discourse on who had more control in the monarchial union of Scotland and England. 7 The English saw the Scottish Parliament as a body that could not govern its own people, particularly the threat posed by Jacobites who desired to restore the Stuart dynasty. Scots wanted a union but only if both countries were able to participate fairly in the new government, where Scotland would not be “reduced…to the position of a mere satellite.” 8 Yet Scotland persisted in attempting to form a political union throughout the troublesome decade of the 1690s when Scotland was continually made a lesser partner in matters at home and abroad. 9 Anti-Scottish and Anti-English rhetoric increased in the eighteenth century.
More prevalent throughout this century was English xenophobia of Scotland, where Scots were portrayed as “vermin-like” and barbarous in their manners and lifestyle. 10 Even the Gaelic language, spoken by as much as one quarter of the population of Scotland at the turn of the eighteenth century, and other Scots dialects were ridiculed by the English in their attempts to alienate the Scots. 11 Much of the distrust of the Scots in general was focused on those who supported the restoration of the House of Stuart, currently residing in exile in Catholic France, a traditional rival of England and close supporters of the Jacobite cause outside the British Isles. 12 The desire of the Jacobites to see the Stuarts once again on the throne, a divine right in itself 6 Ibid.
7 Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 26-29, 58. 9 Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 26; Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 5. 10 Paul Langford, “South Britons’ Reception of North Britons, 1707-1820,” in Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1603-1900: Proceedings of The British Academy, vol. Smout (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 153, 158; Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 1.
11 Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 45; Langford, “South Britons’ Reception of North Britons,” 164-165, 168; Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 12-13. 12 Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 56. 3 according to Jacobite rhetoric, added to a growing English stereotypical view of the Jacobites as backward and militaristic, longing for the chance to restore the Stuarts by force if necessary. 13 The issue of rule by divine right played perfectly into the anti-Catholic and anti-Episcopalian propaganda promulgated by the Protestant English after the Glorious Revolution.
The Jacobite cause was backed largely by an increasingly-isolated Episcopalian population once Presbyterianism returned with the victory of William of Orange after the Battle of the Boyne in 1690. 14 This shift caused many Episcopalians to feel estranged from the rest of the Scottish population, including the process of becoming more involved in political activity. 15 This caused many Episcopalians to distrust any union with an English population that saw them as enemies of the state, demonstrated in the destruction of Episcopalian churches and meeting houses. 16 The influence of more pro-government Presbyterianism and the Church of England ostracized the Episcopalian community by associating them with Catholics, and as consorting with France for a possible invasion of England and restoration of the Stuart dynasty.
17 In the years between William of Orange’s accession to the English and Scottish throne and full political union in 1707, Scotland and its image suffered tremendously from English attempts to position itself in a position of dominance over Scotland in the monarchial union. 18 Yet both countries had significant attributes the other desired. 19 Even William III desired a union 13 Daniel Szechi, 1715: The Great Jacobite Rebellion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 255-256; Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 2-3. 14 Whatley and Patrick, The Scots and the Union, 3.
15 Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 27. 16 Pittock, Inventing and Resisting Britain, 44; John L. Roberts, The Jacobite Wars: Scotland and the Military Campaigns of 1715 and 1745 (Edinburgh: Polygon at Edinburgh, 2002), 3. Pittock asserts that Scottish Presbyterians, while initially associated with Jacobitism, moved farther away as Episcopalians became more associated with the Jacobite movement.
19 Smout, “Introduction,” in Anglo-Scottish Relations, 5-6. 4 of parliaments, a cause taken up by his successor, Queen Anne, in 1702. 20 A political union was seen as a way to stem the rising threat of French-supported Jacobitism in England and Scotland. 21 There was a good support base in Scotland for union, but certain acts passed by the English Parliament, such as the Act of Settlement of 1701 where any future monarch must be Protestant and adhere to the Church of England, and the Alien Act of 1705 that would have made Scots foreigners according to the English, hindered progress to such a union.
22 Riots broke out in towns and cities in Scotland in protest of parliamentary union and English intimidation of the Scots prior to and after the establishment of a British Parliament in May 1707. 23 In light of these events, the Scottish Parliament was dissolved and both England and Scotland were ruled under one governing body with the Act of Union of 1707. Smout argues that “parliamentary union did little in the short run for Anglo-Scottish relations,” and the Scots themselves received little benefit, save for elite in both countries. 24 Despite the afore-mentioned reaction to union in Scotland, the Scots appeared to have accepted the new government better than the English.
25 There was still a deep mistrust of Scots, particularly those with Jacobite sympathies that all Scots were thought to have.