City University of New York (CUNY) CUNY Academic Works Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects CUNY Graduate Center 10-2014 The Legal System and Memory for Analogue Traumatic Experiences Daisy A. Segovia Graduate Center, City University of New York How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! More information about this work at: https://academicworks.edu/gc_etds/381 Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.edu This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND MEMORY FOR ANALOGUE TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCES by DAISY A. SEGOVIA A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York 2014 © 2014 DAISY A.
SEGOVIA All Rights Reserved ii This manuscript has been read and accepted by the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Deryn Strange Date Chair of Examining Committee Maureen O’Connor Date Executive Officer Angela M. Crossman Steven Penrod Melanie K. Takarangi Rachel Zajac Supervisory Committee THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK iii Abstract THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND MEMORY FOR ANALOGUE TRAUMATIC EXPERIENCES by Daisy A. Segovia Advisor: Professor Deryn Strange Trauma and its consequences are ubiquitous in the courtroom.
Research on memory for trauma suggests there is reason to suspect that traumatized people may be prone to memory errors. Additionally, jurors’ views of witnesses are important as they tend to mistrust evidence given by witnesses they believe to be not credible. If traumatized people are prone to errors, is there a way to safeguard against those errors and make jurors more trusting of their memory reports? In Part One, I polled participants on their views toward traumatized people and trauma memory (Study 1). Results of this study suggest people have somewhat positive views of traumatized people’s memory and competency to testify.
Results from Study 2 imply that these views may be unsubstantiated. In Study 2, participants watched a traumatic film with missing scenes. Some saw the scenes unfold in their correct temporal sequence; others saw a random sequence. I manipulated participants’ conscious processing of that film via an instruction: some were told to focus on the meaning of the event (conceptual), some on the sensory details (data-driven), and some received no instruction (control).
A week later, I gave participants a memory test. False recognition of missing clips was high but did not differ across groups. However, experimental participants were more likely than controls to falsely remember the traumatic, compared to iv non-traumatic, missing clips. Moreover, self-reported disorganization appeared more important to the malleability of people’s trauma memories than objective measures.
In Part Two (Study 3), I investigated whether cross-examination safeguarded participants’ memory reports. Participants watched the same film used in Study 2. Then, participants underwent direct examination, which included misleading questions. Participants were accurate on specific questions, but they frequently yielded to misleading questions.Two days later, participants returned for an unexpected cross-examination and memory recognition test.
Participants’ interview and recognition accuracy worsened after cross-examination. Participants misremembered clips that were asked about in cross-examination more often than clips that were not. This research lends further evidence for the malleability of trauma memories and the need for the general public to be educated about this issue. Possible theoretical and practical implications are discussed.
v Acknowledgments This work would not have been possible without the encouragement of many important people. I would like to express my deep appreciation and gratitude to my advisor, Deryn Strange, for her guidance and mentorship. I am truly fortunate to have worked with such a talented and intelligent researcher who is unfailingly dedicated to both her research and her students. It has been a privilege to learn from Deryn and I am grateful to her for instilling in me the qualities of being a good researcher and academic.
I would like to thank my committee members, Drs Angela Crossman, Steven Penrod, Melanie Takarangi, and Rachel Zajac for their guidance and ongoing feedback on my project. I am extremely appreciative of their advice regarding design, statistical analyses, and writing of these research studies. Additionally, I am grateful for the hard work and dedication of my research assistants, especially Ariel Roland-Waring and Jonathan Dayan. It was a pleasure to work with such talented, young researchers with incredible potential.
I wish you luck in your future endeavors. I am extremely appreciative of my friends both in New York and California. Without their company and encouragement I would not have survived the perils of graduate school. Finally, I would like to thank the people who were there at the beginning of my educational journey and guided my early years of research: Stephanie Block Prokosch, Donna Shestowsky, and Ce Ce Iandoli.
I am eternally indebted to them for all of their guidance, support, and friendship throughout the years. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION. 1 CHAPTER 2: PART 1: TRAUMATIC MEMORY. 5 PTSD: The Theories.
6 Source Monitoring Framework. 16 Memory Distortion in Trauma. 17 CHAPTER 3: PTSD IN THE COURTROOM. 20 Juror Perceptions of Eyewitness Memory.
21 Beliefs about Trauma Memory. 22 CHAPTER 4: STUDY 1 OVERVIEW. 26 CHAPTER 5: STUDY 1 METHOD. 29 CHAPTER 6: STUDY 1 RESULTS.
31 Beliefs about Trauma. 35 CHAPTER 7: STUDY 1 DISCUSSION. 39 CHAPTER 8: STUDY 2 OVERVIEW. 43 CHAPTER 9: STUDY 2 METHOD.
53 CHAPTER 10: STUDY 2 RESULTS. 66 CHAPTER 11: STUDY 2 DISCUSSION. 69 CHAPTER 12: PART II: INFLUENCES OF INTERVIEWING ON TRAUMA MEMORY. 73 The Misinformation Effect in Trauma.
77 CHAPTER 13: STUDY 3 OVERVIEW. 80 CHAPTER 14: STUDY 3 METHOD. 86 CHAPTER 15: STUDY 3 RESULTS. 89 viii Preliminary Analyses.
102 Eyewitness Self-Assessment. 109 CHAPTER 16: STUDY 3 DISCUSSION. 111 CHAPTER 17: GENERAL DISCUSSION. 117 Limitations & Future Directions.
122 Appendix A: Attitudes toward Traumatic Memory Questionnaire. 123 Appendix B: Instructional Manipulation Check. 125 Appendix C: Direct Examination Questions. 126 Appendix D: Cross-examination Questions.
129 ix LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Study 1: Demographic Characteristics of Males and Females. 30 Table 2: Study 1: Factor Loadings and Communality Scores for ATTM Questionnaire Items. 33 Table 3: Study 1: Descriptive Statistics for ATTM Factors (N = 343). 37 Table 4: Study 1: Descriptive Statistics for Attitudes toward Traumatized People Factors among Males and Females.
38 Table 5: Study 2: Pilot Testing Means (SDs) and ANOVA Results for Each Film. 46 Table 6: Study 2: Individual Differences Measure Means (SDs), Confidence Intervals, & ANOVA Results. 57 Table 7: Study 2: Recognition Proportion Rates: Means (SDs), Confidence Intervals, & ANOVA Results. 61 Table 8: Study 2: Proportions & Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Missing Crux and Non-Crux Clips Reported as “Old” and “Remembered”.
65 Table 9: Study 2: Analogue PTSD Symptom Means (SDs), Confidence Intervals, & ANOVA Results. 68 Table 10: Study 3: Demographic Characteristics of Males and Females. 88 Table 11: Study 3: Individual Differences Measures: Means (SDs), Confidence Intervals, & ANOVA Results. 97 Table 12: Study 3: Mean Proportions of Details Reported (SDs) and Confidence Intervals for Each Category Type.
98 Table 13: Study 3: Direct Examination Score Means (SDs) and Confidence Intervals for Specific and Misleading Questions. 99 Table 14: Study 3: Cross-Examination Score Means (SDs) and Confidence Intervals for Specific, Misleading, and Repeated Questions. 100 Table 15: Study 3: Recognition Proportion Means (SDs), Confidence Intervals, & One-way ANOVA Results for New and Old Clips. 105 Table 16: Study 3: Proportions & Repeated Measures ANOVA Results for Missing Crux and Non-Crux Clips Reported as “Old” and “Remembered”.
106 x Table 17: Study 3: Analogue PTSD Symptom Means (SDs), Confidence Intervals, & ANOVA Results. 110 xi LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Study 1: Scree plot for factor analysis. Study 2 screenshots of example Missing clips.
55 xii CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION “No diagnosis in the history of American psychiatry has had a more dramatic and pervasive impact on law and social justice than post-traumatic stress disorder…”- Alan A. Trauma and its consequences are ubiquitous in the courtroom. Indeed, most trials involve “an injury, a trauma for which [the trial] compensates and that it attempts to remedy and overcome” (Felman, 1999, p. Historically, a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) has been invoked by defendants to excuse, mitigate, or explain their involvement in a crime, or by prosecutors to establish a causal relationship between a crime and a victim’s subsequent psychopathology, where it is introduced as aggravating evidence in sentencing, or as evidence of the need for victim compensation (Mezey, 2006; Stone, 1993).
However, exactly how traumatic experiences affect memory is also of great importance to the legal system. Witnesses, victims, and even defendants can be psychologically traumatized by their involvement in crime, potentially compromising their memory of the events. If these people are called upon to testify in court, can we trust that their testimony is a reliable account of the crime? Wigmore (1940) asserted that the legal system can permit some errors in memory reports, as long as the facts are correctly assessed by fact-finders, such as jurors. There are a few factors that come into play when assessing facts in memory reports: first, how fact- finders perceive the person giving the memory report is important to decision-making.
Jurors are required to weigh the evidence presented to them in a court of law and decide whether or not a legal wrong was committed and whether that wrong needs to be remedied. However, their perception of the reliability and credibility of the witness often determines their assessment of the facts given by the witness. Indeed, research has shown that jurors’ 1 perceptions of witnesses adversely affect their decision-making (Golding, Dunlap, & Hodell, 2009; Nunez, McCoy, Clark, & Shaw, 1999; Stewart & Jacquin, 2010; Stobbs & Kebbell, 2003). Second, whether or not a person is capable of providing an accurate memory report is also an important factor to consider when assessing facts.
This factor can be influenced by both internal (e., cognitive ability) and external (e. Research shows that some groups of people—for example, children and adults with intellectual disabilities—are more vulnerable to memory errors and more susceptible to suggestion. The adverse affects of trauma, particularly when it results in PTSD, may also make a person more vulnerable to memory errors and suggestion. However, to date, little research has experimentally examined trauma victims’ memory abilities and thus it is unclear whether or not they should be considered a vulnerable group with respect to their memories.
To illustrate the significance of this issue, in 1995, a case was brought before the International Criminal Tribunal in which a woman accused a soldier of rape and sexual assault (Prosecutor v. As a result of the assault, the woman sought medical and psychological treatment and was subsequently diagnosed with PTSD. The Furundzija case was the first to question the impact of PTSD on a witness’ memory (Campbell, 2002). The defense argued that the victim’s testimony was unreliable on the grounds that her memory was adversely affected by her psychological disorder, leading her to falsely identify the accused and give an inconsistent and insufficient account of the assault.
By contrast, the prosecution argued that “inconsistency does not necessarily mean inaccuracy” (p. 163) and that it was more important that the overall representation of the event be accurate than the specific details. The Tribunal had to consider whether the woman had indeed suffered from PTSD (thus, making her medical records and diagnosis known to them) and whether her diagnosis had affected her memory. Ultimately, the Tribunal allowed her psychological 2 reports to be admitted as evidence because those reports, “clearly had the potential to affect the credibility of the prosecution evidence.” The defense’s claims about the unreliability of the victim’s testimony hinged on the “psychological sequelae of PTSD”(Campbell, 2002, p.