FORMATION AND LIFESPANS OF EMERGENT RECOVERY GROUPS IN POST-KATRINA NEW ORLEANS A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the North Dakota State University of Agriculture and Applied Science By Samantha Lea Montano In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of MASTERS OF SCIENCE Major Department: Emergency Management April 2014 Fargo, North Dakota North Dakota State University Graduate School Title Formation and Lifespans of Emergent Recovery Groups in Post-Katrina New Orleans By Samantha Lea Montano The Supervisory Committee certifies that this disquisition complies with North Dakota State University’s regulations and meets the accepted standards for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE: Dr. Jessica Jensen Chair Dr. Carol Cwiak Dr. Daniel Klenow Dr.
Nicholas Bauroth Approved: 4/1/14 Dr. Daniel Klenow Date Department Chair ABSTRACT Following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, numerous groups emerged to address recovery related needs in Orleans and St. The phenomenon of emergent groups is widely noted in the disaster literature, but there has been little empirical research focusing on these groups. And, the existing literature discusses emergent groups primarily in the context of response.
This study sought to explore the factors related to formation of emergent recovery groups (ERGs) and allow ERGs to have an extended lifespan. Data was gathered through in- depth interviews with founders of twenty ERGs that formed to work in Orleans and St. It was found that the factors related to group formation were the same factors that contributed to the continued existence of the ERG including post-event community situational context, unmet needs, a group driver/leader, ability to network, level of integration, and resources. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank the members of my thesis committee, Dr.
Jessica Jensen, Dr. Daniel Klenow, Dr. Carol Cwiak, and Dr. Nicholas Bauroth for their contributions and advisement.
A special thanks is extended to Dr. Jensen for her unwavering guidance and commitment to the development of this study. Your dedication to your students, our program, and emergency management is a constant inspiration. To my fellow graduate students, thank you for being a constant sounding board, source of laughs, and solvers of little problems.
Finally, to the participants in this study, thank you for sharing your knowledge and for your continued work to assist in the recovery efforts. iv DEDICATION To New Orleans – her natives, transplants, and admirers. v TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT. v LIST OF TABLES.
x LiST OF FIGURES. xi LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. xii CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION. 2 Katrina, Subsequent Events, and Impacts.
2 The Context in Which Impacts Occurred. 3 Recovery Assistance in the United States. 10 CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW. 11 Post-disaster Collective Behavior.
14 Conditions for Group Formation. 15 Characteristics of Groups Once Formed. 17 Lifespans of Groups. 19 vi Critique of the Literature.
23 CHAPTER THREE: METHODS. 26 Population and Sampling. 35 CHAPTER FOUR: CHARACTERISTICS & TYPES. 36 Lifespans of Groups in the Sample.
36 Types of ERGs. 61 CHAPTER FIVE: GROUP FORMATION. 63 Post-Katrina Community Situational Context. 77 Ability to Network.
84 CHAPTER SIX: FACTORS RELATED TO LIFESPAN. 101 CHAPTER SEVEN: DISCUSSION. 102 Advancement in Knowledge Regarding Emergent Groups. 102 Factors for Formation.
104 Types of Emergent Recovery Groups. 109 Advancing Knowledge About Lifespan. 111 Connecting Factors Across Formation and Lifespan. 114 Implications for Theory and Practice.
124 CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION. 129 viii APPENDIX A: IRB APPROVAL. 153 APPENDIX B: INTERVIEW GUIDE. 160 APPENDIX C: FOLLOW-UP PROBES.
161 APPENDIX D: INVITATION E-MAIL. 163 APPENDIX E: INFORMATION SHEET. 164 APPENDIX F: PHONE SCRIPT. 166 ix LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1.
Emergent Recovery Group Types According to Driver of Group Formation and Institutionalization of Group. Emergent Recovery Group Structure. Evolution of Tasks. Factors in Emergent Recovery Group Formation and Lifespan .118 x LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1.
Lifespan timeline of emergent recovery groups. Emergent recovery group structure .43 xi LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS DRC. Disaster Research Center ERG. Emergent Recovery Group FEMA.
Federal Emergency Management Agency GNO. Greater New Orleans Area IA. Individual Assistance IRB. Institutional Review Board IRS.
Internal Revenue Service LTRC. Long-term Recovery Committee PA. Public Assistance PDD. Presidential Disaster Declaration PDE.
Presidentially Declared Emergency xii CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION Following disasters, affected communities require considerable assistance. This assistance is commonly provided by a variety of pre-existing organizations from government, the private sector (i., businesses and nonprofits), and individuals. Disaster assistance is also provided by newly formed groups. Disaster research suggests that the emergence of groups post-disaster is normal and that the assistance they provide is ultimately beneficial to impacted communities.
A significant amount of work has noted groups that temporarily form and undertake various response activities—activities intended to save lives, property, and/or the environment immediately after disasters (e., groups form to conduct search and rescue in impacted neighborhoods). The fact that groups emerge and undertake recovery activities—activities intended to restore, reshape, and/or rebuild various parts of the community that have been impacted by the disaster (e., groups form to rebuild homes)—has been mentioned in the literature, but there has been very little empirical work exploring what leads to the formation of these groups or how long they last. This study explored both of these gaps in the literature focusing on the formation of emergent recovery groups (ERGs) and factors that led to their continued existence. This study addressed the following specific questions: 1.
What factors led to the formation of ERGs post-Katrina? 2. What factors drive the continued existence of post-Katrina ERGs? The goal of this research is to contribute to the emergency management body of knowledge regarding an overlooked aspect of disaster recovery—emergent groups. 1 Background This chapter provides background needed to understand this study’s research questions and evaluate the study’s significance. First, the impacts from Hurricane Katrina and subsequent events and the context in which they occurred are discussed.
Second, the United States recovery system at the time of Katrina is then explained including the role that a variety of individuals and groups must play in recovery given this system. Finally, the concept of emergent groups is introduced in the context of post-Katrina New Orleans. Katrina, Subsequent Events, and Impacts Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana as a Category 3 storm on the morning of August 29, 2005. The impacts of the storm were widespread—138 parishes and counties along the Gulf Coast were devastated (Brookings Institution, 2005; Townsend, 2006).
The most significant impacts occurred in areas that experienced not just the hurricane itself but also subsequent flooding. At Katrina’s peak, a 15-½ foot storm surge funneled between the manmade Intracoastal Waterway and the Mississippi River–Gulf Outlet (Campanella, 2008). The storm surge overtopped some levees and pressured others to the point of breaching (Campanella, 2008; Townsend, 2006) resulting in widespread flooding1. Eighty percent of New Orleans was submerged in up to 20 feet of contaminated floodwaters (Bevc, Nicholls, & Picou, 2010; Townsend, 2006; Waple, 2005).
The city’s infrastructure and utilities including the, drinking water system, airports, electricity and communication services, and majority of highways were either damaged or destroyed (Townsend, 2006; Waple, 2005). An estimated 1,450 deaths resulted from Katrina and subsequent flooding in Louisiana (Dash, 2010; Jonkman, Maaskant, Boyd, Levitan, 2009). 1 Hurricane Katrina can be understood throughout this study to reference both the Hurricane itself and the failure of the federal flood protection system. 2 Evacuated residents that returned to the city found destroyed homes (Brunkard, Namulanda, Ratard, 2008; McCarthy, Sastry, & Pollard, 2006), a changed job market (Liu, Fellowes, & Mabanta, 2006; McCarthy, Sastry, & Pollard, 2006), and a lack of basic services (Liu & Plyer, 2007; McCarthy, Sastry, & Pollard, 2006).
The Context in Which Impacts Occurred Under the best of circumstances, New Orleans would have faced a long and complex recovery from these impacts. Recovery is defined as “the differential process of restoring, rebuilding, and reshaping the physical, social, economic, and natural environment through pre- event planning and post-event actions” (Smith & Wenger, 2006, p. Local government bears primary responsibility for managing the overall recovery process in the United States (see for example: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2011; Smith, 2011). And, ideally, local government manages the process in a holistic way that links recovery for individuals and households, organizations, and government and pursues sustainability at each opportunity (see for example: Alesch et al., 2009; Natural Hazards Center, 2005; Smith & Wenger, 2006; Smith, 2011).
Yet, due to pre-event vulnerabilities, the city did not have the resources to navigate this process even minimally without considerable assistance much less holistically. Even so, the system recognized the unique nature of Katrina and every organization stretched their every day activities to attend to the event (see for example: Gray & Herbert, 2007; Morris, Morris, & Jones, 2007; Smith, 2011). The milieu of vulnerability of New Orleans was considerable pre-Katrina. Vulnerability can be understood for the purposes of this study to be the aspects of the ecological, economic, political, social, and constructed environments that render a people and/or place prone to impacts 3 from a hazard.
This definition is consistent with the ideas presented in Bankoff, Frerks, & Hilhorst (2004). The area evidenced severe ecological vulnerability due to decimated wetlands, a complex and poorly maintained flood prevention system, and the fact that 49% of the city was below sea level (Campanella, 2008). The area also had a fragile economy (Brookings Institution, 2005; Phillips, 2009; Townsend, 2006), a weakened housing market (Brookings Institution, 2005; Phillips, 2009) and crumbling infrastructure (Bevc, Nicholls, & Picou, 2010; Gall & Cutter, 2012; Phillips, 2009; Townsend, 2006). The education (Eargle, Esmail, & Das, 2010; Gall & Cutter, 2012; Hill & Hannaway, 2006; Phillips, 2009) and healthcare systems (Christensen, Weinstock, & Williams, 2006; Gall & Cutter, 2012; Kutner, 2010) were also insecure and inadequate pre-Katrina.
New Orleans was also politically vulnerable pre-Katrina (Brookings Institution, 2005; Gall & Cutter, 2012; LoveKamp, 2010). The city of New Orleans had a history of political corruption and a lack of trust between residents and government officials (Brinkley, 2006; McQuaid & Schleifstein, 2006; Van Heerden & Bryan, 2006). The city of New Orleans and the state of Louisiana had long failed to collaborate (Gall & Cutter, 2012; Government Accountability Office, 2010; Smith, 2011) and the entities had a history of fighting over funding and control (Burns & Thomas, 2008). The impacts from Katrina and subsequent flooding combined with the pre-existing vulnerabilities left New Orleans’ city government unable to independently manage the recovery process and without the support of the state.
Unfortunately, most residents within the city were in no better a position to go about restoring, reshaping, and rebuilding the parts of their lives that were impacted. It is common for individuals to address disaster impacts with their own resources after disaster and/or resources 4 from friends and family (see for example: Bolin & Trainer, 1978; Chappell, Forgette, Swanson, & van Boening, 2007; Hurlbert, Haines, & Beggs, 2000; Ibanez et al., 2003; McDonnell et al. Yet, many, if not most, New Orleans residents were unable to go about the recovery process on their own or with the help of kin. Post-disaster, individuals can address disaster impacts autonomously by utilizing their savings, investments, insurance payouts, etcetera (see for example: Bolin & Trainer, 1978), but in New Orleans many did not have these resources upon which to rely.
Twenty-three percent of the population in New Orleans lived below the poverty line, compared with a national average of 12% (Dash, 2010). There was also extreme racial stratification in poverty rates—84% of blacks in New Orleans fell below the poverty line in 2000 (Brookings Institution, 2005; Dash, 2010). The result of this segregation was that “neighborhoods that were more than 75% black” also tended to be areas of concentrated poverty (Dash, 2010, p.