University of Richmond UR Scholarship Repository Honors Theses Student Research 5-1974 Power, elitism, and lawyers: an examination of the Richmond legal establishment and its impact on the making of social and economic policy-making within the commonwealth of Virginia. John Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.edu/honors-theses Recommended Citation St., "Power, elitism, and lawyers: an examination of the Richmond legal establishment and its impact on the making of social and economic policy-making within the commonwealth of Virginia. This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository.
For more information, please contact scholarshiprepository@richmond. UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LIBRARIES ~I I Il I I II/IIIII/I I IIIII/I I IIIII/I I /Ill IIIII/I 1111111111111111 3 3082 01 028 2217. POWER, ~LIT ISM, AND LAWYERs: AN EXAMINATION OF THE RICHMOND LEGAL E~TABLI~HMENT AND IT:.; IMPACT ON THE MAKING OF :.;OCIAL AND ECONOMIC POLICY WITHIN THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA. by ~TEPHEN CRAIG :.
JOHN HONORs T~~IS ~ubmitted in partial fulfillment o!' the requirements for the degree of Bachelor or Arts with Honors in the Department of Political t)cience of the University of Richmond, May, 1974 TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. INTRODUCTION, STATEMENT OF PURPOSE, AND JUSTIFICATION •. 1 Introduction and Statement of-Purpose • • • • • • • • • • 1 Scope of the Project. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 6 Justification for Interest.
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY: THE CRITERIA TO BE USED IN ELITE IDENTIFICATION • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 13 Identifying Elites; Previous Attempts • • • •. • • 13 Economic Indicators of Elitism • • •. • ~ 15 • Social Indicators of Elitism. 17 Physical Indicators of Elitism.
18 Political Indicators of Elitism • •. • • • • • • 21 The Self-Identifying Elite • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 22 III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE RICHMOND LEGAL ELITE; APPLICATION 01<' THE ELITE INDICATORS • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 24 Economic Indicators • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 24 Social Indicators • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 38 Physical Indicators •. • • • • • • • 58 • The Self-Identifying Elite • • • • • •• •.
THE FEW; Tflli METHODS, PRACTICES, AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LEGAL EtiTABLISHMENT • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 69 Recruitment: The Garnering of New Blood •• • • • • • 71 The Organization: Deciding Who Does What and How • • • • 76 Bureaucratic Stronghold or Free Profession? • • • • • • • 82 Miscellaneous Ramblings • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 87 CHAPTER PAGE V.NY: SURVEY OF THE RANK-AND-FILE OF THE RICHMOND METROPOLITAN LEGAL COMl"IUNITY. Comparative Analysis of Law Firms. THE LEGAL ESTABLISID1r:N1' IN ACTION: LAWYER/LOBBYISTS D~ THE VIRGINIA GENERAL ASSEMBLY • •. 120 Who Are The Lobbyists? • • • • 0 •.
126 Who Do The Lobbyists Represent •. • • 132 The Organization Set-up For Lobbying Services ••••• 138 The Style of Lobbying Representation • • • • • • • • • • 141 The Blue Laws Controversy: 1974. • • 148 Summary and Conclusion • VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION • • •.
150 The Legal Establishment: A Viable Concept? •. • • • 155 BIBLIOGRAPHY APPENDICES Appendix A; Sample Questionnaire Used in Survey of Richmond Lawyers January-February 1974 Appendix B; Listing of the Individual Members of the Law Firms Who Comprise The Legal Establishment Appendix C; Letter From The Firm of Mays, Valentine, Davenport and Moore Appendix D; Other Correspondence Appendix E; Lawyer/Lobbyists in Recent Sessions of the Virginia General Assembly Appendix F; Clients Represented In a Lobbying Capacity By Law Firms Before Recent General Assemblies Appendix G; Residential Distribution of Richmond Legal Elites TABLES PAGE TABLE III-I - Representative Clients of Elite Law Firms of the Richmond Area 25 TABLE III-II - Representation of Area Attorneys on Corporate Boards of Directors 33 TABLE III-III - Representation of Elite Firm Actors on Corporate Boards of Directors 34 TABLE III-IV - Representation of Law Firm Actors on University Policy-Making Bodies 39 TABLE III-V Representation of Law Firm Actors in Philanthropic and Social Organizations 41 TABLE III-VI - Representation of Law Firm Actors in Elite Social Organizations 43 TABLE II I-VII - Numerical Representation of Attorneys, Staff, and Physical Resources in Richmond Area Law Firms 45 TABLE III-VIII - Representation of Graduates of Blue-Chip Law Schools in Richmond Area Law Firms 50 TABLE III-IX - Academic Achievement of Richmond Area Law Firm Members as Undergraduates and as Law Students 53 TABLE III-X - Representation of Local Attorneys in Positions of Leadership in Professional-Related Groups 55 TABLE III-XI - Representation of Richmond Attorneys in Key Political Bodies 59 TABLE III-XII - The Self-Identifying Elite; Opinion Responses from Survey of Metropolitan Richmond Lawyers - Part II 65 Page TABLE V-I - Age of Attorneys Practicing in the Richmond Area 92 TABLE V-II - Colleges Attended by Richmond Attorneys 94 TABLE V-III· - Undergraduate Academic Performance of Richmond Attorneys 96 TABLE V-IV - Law Schools Attended by Richmond Attorneys 98 TABLE V-V - Rank in Law School of Richmond Attorneys 99 TABLE V-VI - Size of Richmond Area Law Firms 102 TABLE V-VII - Area of Practice of Richmond Attorneys 103 TABLE V-VIII - Ideological Affiliation of Richmond Lawyers 106' TABLE V-IX - Partisan ~ffiliation of Richmond Lawyers 107 TABLE V-X - Annual Income of Richmond Attorneys 109 TABLE V-XI - Cross-Tabulation of Law Firm Membership by Under- graduate Grade Point Average 112 TABLE V-XII - Cross-Tabulation of Law Firm Membership by Member of at Least One College Honor Society 113 TABLE V-XIII - Cross-Tabulation of Law Firm Membership by Membership in Omnicron Delta Kappa 1~ TABLE V-XIV - Cross-Tabulation of Law Firm Membership by Membership in Phi Beta Kappa 115 TABLE V-XV - Cross-Tabulation of Law Firm Membership by Membership in a Law Review 117 TABLE V-XVI - Cross-Tabulation of Law Firm Membership by Class Rank in Law School 118 TABLE VI-I - Lawyer/Lobbyists in Recent Gener~l Assemblies ~1 TABLE VI-II - Lobbying Fees Garnered at Recent General Assemblies by Lawyer/Lobbyists 136 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION,. OF PURPOSE, AND JUSTIFICATION .; ' Introduction and t>tatement of Purpose Within the annals of American academia, much time and effort has been expended in the attempt to answer the crucial question of who wields power within the community and more specifically inside the realm of governmental policy-making. This pursuit has taken many forms and focuses throughout the years, as the spotlight of community power inquiries have shifted from one group of societal actors to another.however have quite ·fre- quently neglected to give proper consideration to the immensely important roles played in the community and governmental power structure by those in- dividuals who collectively form the legal profession.
Of all the multitude of actors who are vitally involved in the decision~rnaking processes. of American society, perhaps no ori~~llectively wields and executes rno~e power and influence within the domestic arena than do the barristers of their nation. As a private grouping within the society, Arnericanlawyers tend to be influ- ential and powerful not only in many of the non-governmental areas of the corn- munity1 playing important roles in the maintenance and functioning of business, commerce, and civic life in general, but in the governmental realm as well 1. where they often dominate the political processes.· The legal profession does in this connection perform many crucial tasks in a modern society.
'often act as a catalyst, providing what has been termed "the grease" of a society, in .their functioning as negotiators and settlers of private disputes. They also ser\reas an important bridge between the private and public realms of 2 society, and in addition provide the most frequently tapped pool of politi- cal actors on all three levels of American government. Indeed, over one hundred years ago the noted French social philosopher and student of American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, saw the lawyer as the aristocracy of this country. While this may be somewhat of an overstatement, the undeniable fact remains that attorneys do form a large portion of the upper classes of Ameri- can society and government.
Therefore, it is quite evident that lawyers are very important and strategic people in our American society, and are an ex-. ~-'- cellent grouping at which to look~ attempting to determine who wields power and influence in a community. However, while it is doubtful that any individual would dispute the claim that lawyers as a group are powerful and important members of society, a most important question remains much in doubt. Granting the validity of the con- cept that the legal profession is powerful and influential, a second and most vital inquiry must be, are all lawyers equal in power, standing, and expertise, or are some lawyers more powerful and influential than others? This derivative of the original premise in essence cuts to the very heart of the matter of de- termining who are the true wielders of disproportionate power in a community.
Social stratification in a society along class lines is a widely acknowledged and accepted concept./ the same stratification process occur within the elite itself, forming what has been coined as "an elite within an elite"? u· this is in fact the case, that the legal profession is stratified and some lawyers do enjoy higher standing, prestige, and recognition, and do wield more power and influence than their fellow professionals, this would be highly significant and do much to explain the allocation of power within a given locale and how the decisions of policy significance are actually deter- mined. Thus it is in this light that researchers have turned to the concept 3 of a legal elite or legal establishment to explain and elucidate the public and private decision-making processes in American society. The study of legal elitism in the profession bega~ with studies of those firms in New York and Washington who by their physical and reputa- tional resources are able to dominate their respective policy arenas and exercise disproportionate power for their clients, the large corporations of America. These first studies, undertaken for the most part in the 1950's and early sixties, tend to be sociological in motive, concentrating primarily on the implication of the emergence of large-scale bureaucrat- ization in these large metropolitan firms in the legal profession.
1 Among the most famous of American sociologists and academicians is the renowned student of elitism and power, the late c. Wright Mills of Columbia University, who was one of the very first individuals to examine lawyers in the nation's largest law firms as an elite. Mills saw the emerging development of the legal elite as long ago as 19S6, writing in his now-classic study, The Power Elite; The inner core of the power elite also includes men of the higher legal and financial type from the great law factories and investment firms, who are almost pro- fessional go-betweens of economic, political and military affairs, and who thus act to unify the power elite. The corporation lawyer and the investment banker perform the functions of the "go-between" effectively and powerfully.