Mối Quan Hệ Động Giữa Quyền Sở Hữu Quản Lý và Hiệu Suất Doanh Nghiệp Tại Việt Nam

2016

82
0
0

Phí lưu trữ

30 Point

Mục lục chi tiết

DECLARATION

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ABSTRACT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF ABBREVIATION

1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1. Problem statement

1.2. Research objectives

1.3. Research questions

1.4. Contributions of the thesis

1.5. Research scope

1.6. Structure of the thesis

2. CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. The theoretical background of managerial ownership and firm’s performance

2.1.1. The agency approach

2.1.2. The incentive effect

2.1.3. The entrenchment effect

2.1.4. The managerial discretion approach

2.1.5. The timing approach

2.1.6. Endogeneity of managerial ownership

2.2. The empirical evidences of relationship between managerial ownership and firm’s performance and limitations

2.2.1. The research in worldwide and the limitations

2.2.2. The exogenous managerial ownership

2.2.3. The endogenous managerial ownership

2.2.4. The empirical evidence in Vietnam

2.2.5. The corporate governance of Vietnamese listed firms

2.2.6. The conceptual framework

3. CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA

3.1. Definition and measurements of firm’s performance

3.1.1. Accounting – based measurements

3.1.2. Market–based measurements

3.2. Definition and measurement of managerial ownership

3.3. The empirical model

3.3.1. The determinants of firm’s performance and optimal managerial ownership

3.3.1.1. The determinants of firm’s performance
3.3.1.2. The determinants of optimal managerial ownership level
3.3.1.3. The movement of actual managerial ownership

3.3.2. The explanation of the large change in managerial ownership

3.3.3. The dynamic relationship between managerial ownership and firm’s performance

4. CHAPTER 4: RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

4.1. The determinants and movement of managerial ownership

4.1.1. The determinants of managerial ownership

4.1.2. The movement of actual managerial ownership

4.2. The explanation of the large change (decrease or increase)

4.2.1. The statistics by group

4.2.2. The likelihood regression of large change (increase or decrease) against the change in firms’ characteristics and market condition

4.3. Dynamics of managerial ownership and firm’s performance

4.3.1. Firm’s performance: accounting-based measurement

4.3.2. Firm’s performance: market-based measurement

5. CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

5.1. The implications for enterprises

5.2. The implications for Vietnam’s authority and the Government

5.3. The limitations and further research

5.3.1. The further research

Luận văn thạc sĩ ueh the dynamic relationship between managerial ownership and firms performance in vietnams