Declaration
1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1. Problem statement
1.2. Research objectives
1.3. Research questions
1.4. Research scope
1.5. The thesis structure
2. CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. The theoretical literature
2.2. Perspectives of family’s effect
2.2.1. Why is family ownership different from other concentrated ownership?
2.3. Theoretical background of corporate governance
2.3.1. The perspective of “Legalistic” theory
2.3.2. The theory of “Resources dependence”
2.3.3. The theory of “Hegemony”
2.4. Corporate governance framework
2.4.1. The conceptualization of the “Corporate Governance”
2.4.2. Why does corporate governance matter for the company?
2.4.3. Vietnam’s corporate governance and institutional background
2.4.4. The adoption of corporate governance standards in Vietnam’s context
2.4.5. Legal framework in Vietnam
2.5. Strategic risk and performance
2.5.1. The initial approach
2.5.2. The perspective of “risk behavior” theory
2.5.3. The perspective of “prospect” theory
2.5.4. The perspective of “Behavior” theory
2.5.5. The strategy of “diversification”
2.5.6. Idiosyncratic (unsystematic) risk and family’s business
2.5.7. The reinforcement of the family’s power
2.5.8. The respondent strategy for the threat
2.5.9. The diversification, risk, and family’s decision
2.6. Empirical evidence of family effect on firm’s performance
2.7. Empirical evidence of corporate governance on firm performance
2.8. Empirical evidences of strategic risk on firm’s performance
2.9. Empirical evidences of idiosyncratic risk on family’s business
2.10. Hypothesis construction and the conceptual framework
2.10.1. The family’s effect and the firm performance
2.10.2. The corporate governance factors and the firm performance
2.10.3. The role of board size
2.10.4. The role of diversity and independent directors
2.10.5. The role of duality
2.10.6. The role of board’s experience
2.10.7. The role of foreign ownership
2.10.8. The strategic risk, family’s effect and firm performance
2.10.9. The strategic risk and firm performance
2.10.10. The idiosyncratic (unsystematic) risk, family and firm performance
2.10.11. The various facets of firm performance
2.10.12. The conceptual framework
2.10.13. The constructed model
3. CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1. Multivariate analysis of variance
3.2. Multivariate regression model
3.3. The Generalized structural equation model (GSEM)
3.4. The recursive (causal) structural models
3.5. The path diagrams and the system of equation
3.6. The measurement of risk
3.7. The sensitive analysis of sample selection model
3.8. The descriptions by groups
3.9. The variable correlation
4. CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1. The family’s effects, corporate governance, and firm performance
4.2. The family’s involvement, corporate governance and firm performance
4.3. The founding family, corporate governance and firm performance
4.4. The family CEO, corporate governance and firm performance
4.5. The strategic risk, family’s effects, and firm performance
4.6. The strategic risk, family’s involvement, and performance
4.7. The strategic risk, founding family, and performance
4.8. The strategic risk, family CEO, and performance
4.9. The sensitive analysis
4.10. The implications for the companies
4.11. The implications for the Vietnam’s authority and government
4.12. The limitation and further researches
4.13. The overlap map of family’s aspects
4.14. The perspective of ownership concentration
4.15. The perspective of the OECD principals
LIST OF TABLES
LIST OF FIGURES
