Universidade do Minho Escola de Economia e Gestão Phuc Thi Tran HOW ARE SOUTHEAST ASIAN SMALL COUNTRIES COPING WITH THE RISE OF CHINA? HOW ARE SOUTHEAST ASIAN SMALL COUNTRIES COPING WITH THE RISE OF CHINA? THE CASE OF VIETNAM THE CASE OF VIETNAM Phuc Thi Tran UMinho|2012 May 2012 Universidade do Minho Escola de Economia e Gestão Phuc Thi Tran HOW ARE SOUTHEAST ASIAN SMALL COUNTRIES COPING WITH THE RISE OF CHINA? THE CASE OF VIETNAM Master in International Relations Supervisor: Professor Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira Co-supervisor: Professor Laura C. Ferreira-Pereira May 2012 É AUTORIZADA A REPRODUÇÃO PARCIAL DESTA DISSERTAÇÃO APENAS PARA EFEITOS DE INVESTIGAÇÃO, MEDIANTE DECLARAÇÃO ESCRITA DO INTERESSADO, QUE A TAL SE COMPROMETE; Universidade do Minho, ___/___/______ Assinatura: ________________________________________________ ACKNOWLEDGMENT I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all those who gave me the possibility to complete this thesis. First and foremost, I am deeply indebted to my supervisor Professor Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, from School of Economics and Management, University of Minho and co-supervisor Professor Laura Cristina Ferreira-Pereira, from School of Social and Political Sciences of the Technical University of Lisbon (ISCSP- UTL) for their supervision and guidance. They help me broaden my view and knowledge.
They both correct and stimulate suggestions for improvement and encouragement that helped me in all the time of research for and writing of this thesis. Without their expertise, understanding, and patience, I would not have finished this thesis. Secondly, I also must acknowledge Loc Doan, Research Associate at the Global Policy Institute, Aston University in London for his suggestions for and provision of the front materials evaluated in this study. Especially, I would like to give my special thanks to my parents, brother and sisters whose patient love and their stimulating support.
They have encouraged me to go ahead with my thesis and enabled me to complete this work. In conclusion, I recognize that this study would not have been possible without the assistance of the Erasmus Mundus scholarship programme that gives me invaluable opportunities to experience daily and study life in Europe. iii ABSTRACT Over the past two decades, Southeast Asia (SEA) region has witnessed considerable security threats such as armed rivalries of both inter-and intra-state kinds as well as non-traditional threats including terrorism. Even though none of them has led to a large-scale destabilization of the whole region, SEA is nevertheless facing perennially the threat of military conflict.
The actors of such potential military conflict would be the ones currently engaged into the territorial disputes over the South China Sea (SCS): China on the one hand and states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the other hand. The contested territories, such as the Paracel and Spratly Islands, including the vast surrounding water areas where sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) pass, have become an object of not only territorial, but also economic and strategic competition. The SCS disputes might thus upset the current status quo that emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War. China, the rising power in Asia, should be regarded both as a benign power as well as security threat for peace and stability in the region.
Chinese soft power assumes a growingly important role in Chinese foreign policy, in connection with the aspiration to promote a benign image of the China rise. However, the study argues that China’s overarching strategy towards SEA has been a careful mix of soft and hard postures. It notes that a growing asymmetry of naval power to the advantage of China is causing concern both among SEA states and external major players with interests in the region. Against this backdrop, the present dissertation explores how SEA states have sought to mitigate the increasingly unequal power distribution in the SCS, while focusing on Vietnam as its case study.
SEA states tend to cope with China not by deploying balancing strategies - either by aligning with the US, or reinforcing ASEAN exclusively, but rather hedging strategies: SEA states do not want to choose between either China or US. While adopting an analytical approach founded on a dialogue with the existing academic literature, this study presents empirical evidence which corroborates the hedging dynamics in the region. At the same time, the contribution goes a step further by arguing that the SEA states have adopted a particular type of hedging. The latter consisted in actively seeking the engagement of such external major players as the US, India, Japan, Russia, and the EU, in the existing regional fora, namely the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and East Asia Summit.
Key words: China, ASEAN, Vietnam, US, Japan, India, EU and Russia. v SUMÁRIO Nas últimas duas décadas, a região do Sudeste Asiático foi testemunha de consideráveis ameaças securitárias, como conflitos armados, tanto intra- como inter-estaduais incluindo o terrorismo. Apesar de nenhuma destas ameaças ter produzido uma profunda desestabilização da região, o Sudeste Asiático está permanentemente confrontado com a ameaça do conflito militar. As atores deste conflito potencial serão os mesmos das disputas territoriais no Mar da China Meridional (MCM): China por um lado e a ASEAN (Associação de Nações do Sudeste Asiático) por outro.
Os territórios contestados, como as ilhas de Spratly e Paracel, inclusivamente as vastas águas adjacentes onde passam vias de comunicação estratégicas, tornaram-se não só objeto da competição territorial e estratégica, mas também económica. As disputas do MCM podem, deste modo, alterar o existente status quo que se tinha estabelecido desde o fim da Guerra Fria. A China, potência emergente da Ásia, tem que ser compreendida como poder benigno e ameaça securitária para a região. O ‘soft power’ da China assume uma crescente importância na política externa chinesa, no contexto da aspiração de projetar uma visão benigna da ascensão da China.
No entanto, esta contribuição argumenta que a estratégia dominante da China representa uma mistura cuidadosa entre posturas no sentido de ‘soft power’ e ‘hard power’. Nota-se também uma assimetria crescente do poder naval que favorece China, o que suscita preocupação entre os países da região bem como dos atores externos com interesses no Sudeste Asiático. Neste contexto, a contribuição explora como os países da região tem procurado mitigar a distribuição assimétrica de poder na região, enquanto se foca no estudo de caso do Vietname. Os países do MCM tendem a lidar com a ascensão da China, não através da adoção de ‘balancing’, enquanto se alinham com os EUA ou reforçam exclusivamente a ASEAN, mas através de estratégias de ‘hedging’: os estados do Sudeste Asiático não querem escolher entre a China e os EUA.
Enquanto se adota uma abordagem que se baseia num diálogo com a literatura académica existente, a contribuição apresenta evidência empírica que comprova as dinâmicas de ‘hedging’ na região. Ao mesmo tempo, o estudo vai um passo mais à frente ao afirmar que os estados do Sudeste Asiático tem adotado um tipo especial de hedging, que consiste na procura ativa de envolvimento dos atores externos como os EUA, Índia, Japão, Rússia, e a UE, nos fóruns regionais existentes, nomeadamente ASEAN, Fórum Regional ASEAN, e a Cimeira da Ásia Oriental. Palavras-chave: China, ASEAN, Vietname, EUA, Japão, Índia, UE e Rússia. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENT.
vii TABLE OF CONTENTS. ix LIST OF FIGURES. xi LIST OF TABLES. xiii LIST OF APPENDICES.
xv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS. xvii CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION. Rational and Background. State of the Art.
Aim of the Study. Methodology and Data. The Structure of Research. Scope and Limit.
14 CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK - THE CONCEPTS OF POWER, BALANCING AND HEDGING. Dimensions of Power. Hard Power and Soft Power. Concepts of Balancing and Hedging.
23 CHAPTER 3: THE RISE OF CHINA AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION. The Rise of China: History and Achievements. Major Implications for the Region: A Benign Image or A Threat. Chinese Soft Power in the Region.
Chinese Hard Power in the Region. 49 ix CHAPTER 4: CHARACTERIZATION OF REGIONAL DYNAMICS IN SEA. Overview of SEA Region: Economic and Security Dimensions. Economic Potential and Prosperity.
Maritime Geo-political Importance. Characterization of Regional Dynamics in SEA. The European Union. 91 CHAPTER 5: COPING WITH THE RISE OF CHINA – THE CASE OF VIETNAM.
Geo-politic Importance of the SCS to Stability and Development of Vietnam. Vietnam’s Dilemmas within ASEAN and regarding the Alignment with the US. Vietnam’s Coping with the Rise of China: a Case of SCS Disputes. More Engagement in Vietnam’s Relationships with China.
Engagement with Other Players in Dialogue Partnership Frameworks and Other Multilateral Mechanism. Secondary Data Sources. Primary Data Sources. 143 APPENDIX 1: THE HAINAN ISLAND MAP.
149 APPENDIX 2: YULIN NAVAL BASE IN HAINAN ISLAND. 151 x LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: China’s infrastructure projects within the GMS initiatives of the Asian Development Bank in SEA.34 Figure 2: China’s claims in the SCS .46 Figure 3: The SLOCs through the SCS (transit the Strait of Malacca) .52 Figure 4: China’s ‘String of Pearls’ in Indian Ocean.64 Figure 5: China’s claims on the first and the second island chain .71 xi LIST OF TABLES Table 1: ASEAN Trade with China from 1996 - 2008. 38 Table 2: Visitors Arrival to ASEAN, China vis-à-vis Total from 1996 - 2008. 41 xiii LIST OF APPENDICES APPENDIX 1: THE HAINAN ISLAND MAP.
149 APPENDIX 2: YULIN NAVAL BASE IN HAINAN ISLAND. 151 xv LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ADB Asian Development Bank ADS Approved Destination Status AEC ASEAN economic community-building AEMM ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meetings AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area AJCEP ASEAN-JAPAN Comprehensive Economic Partnership AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation APRIS ASEAN Programme for Regional Integration Support ARF ASEAN Regional Forum ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEM Asia Cooperation Forum-Europe CAFTA China-ASEAN Free Trade Area CBMs Confidence Building Measures CCP Chinese Communist Party CEP Comprehensive Economic Partnership CLMV Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam DAC Development Assistance Committee DOC Declaration on a Code of Conduct on the South China Sea xvii EAC East Asian Community EAEP EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership EAS East Asia Summit EC European Community EPG Eminent Persons Group ERIA Economic Research Institute for ASEAN ESDP European Security and Defense Policy EU European Union FDI Foreign Direct Investment GDP Gross Domestic Products GMS Great Mekong Sub-region IAI Initiative for ASEAN Integration IMEF International Military and Education Funding IMF International Monetary Fund ISMs Inter-Sessional Meetings JMSDF Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force JMSU Marine Seismic Undertaking JSDF Japan Self Defense Force NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NDPG National Defence Programme Guidelines xviii NSC New Security Concept ODA Overseas Development Assistance/Official Development Aid OECD Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development PACOM Pacific Commands PLA People’s Liberation Army PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy PMCs Post Ministerial Conferences PRC People Republic of China PSC Political Security Community PSI Proliferation Security Initiatives READI Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument SARS Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome SCC Social Culture Community SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization SCS The South China Sea SCUN Security Council United Nations SEA Southeast Asia region SLOCs Sea Lanes of Communication SU Soviet Union TAC Treaty of Amity and Cooperation xix TREATI Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative UNCLOS the United Nations Commission on Limits to Continental Shelves US The United States VCPCC Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee VFA Visiting Forces Agreement WTO World Trade Organization ZOPFAN Nuclear-free Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality xx Chapter 1 – Introduction CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1. Rational and Background In recent decades, China’s rise through the transforming steps has surprised and overwhelmed the world. China1 is regarded as a lion which “is waking up to shake the world", as Napoleon B.
predicted in the early 19th century.2 More recently, in the 1970s, his prediction has been taken up to the once best- seller book entitled “Quand la Chine s’éveillera” (when China wakes up) by Alain Peyrefite, a French politician.