SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT Ian Morris © Ian Morris Stanford University October 2010 http://www.org 1 Tai Lieu Chat Luong Contents List of Tables, Maps, Figures, and Graphs 4 1 Introduction 7 2 Formal Definition 9 3 Core Assumptions 10 3.5 The focus on East and West 11 3.8 Approximation and falsification 16 4 Core Objections 17 4.4 Empirical errors 21 5 Models for an Index of Social Development 22 5.1 Social development indices in neo-evolutionary anthropology 22 5.2 The United Nations Human Development Index 23 6 Trait Selection 25 7 Methods of Calculation 26 8 Energy Capture 28 8.1 Energy capture, real wages, and GDP, GNP, and NDI per capita 28 8.2 Units of measurement and abbreviations 32 8.3 The nature of the evidence 33 8.4 Estimates of Western energy capture 35 8.1 The recent past, 1700-2000 CE 36 8.3 Between ancient and modern (200–1700 CE) 50 8.4 Late Ice Age hunter-gatherers (c.5 From foragers to imperialists (14,000-500 BCE) 59 8.6 Western energy capture: discussion 73 2 8.5 Estimates of Eastern energy capture 75 8.1 The recent past, 1800-2000 CE 79 8.2 Song dynasty China (960-1279 CE) 83 8.3 Early modern China (1300-1700 CE) 85 8.5 Between ancient and medieval (200-1000 CE) 91 8.6 Post-Ice Age hunter-gatherers (c.7 From foragers to imperialists (9500-200 BCE) 95 8.6 Energy capture: discussion 105 9.1 Methods, assumptions, and sources 107 9.2 Estimates of Western city sizes 109 9.3 Estimates of Eastern city sizes 117 9.4 City-size: discussion 128 9.1 City-size as a proxy measure for social organization 128 9.2 City-size/organizational capacity as a function of energy capture 129 9.3 Magnitudes of city-size 134 10.0 War-Making Capacity 136 10.1 Measuring war-making capacity 136 10.2 Western war-making capacity 138 10.1 The 20th-century transformation 138 10.2 The European military revolution, 1500-1800 CE 144 10.3 From Caesar to Suleiman, 1-1500 CE 148 10.4 Early warfare, 3000-1 BCE 153 10.3 Eastern war-making capacity 156 10.1 The East-West military balance in 2000 CE 156 10.2 The East’s modern military revolution, 1850-2000 CE 159 10.3 War-making capacity in the gunpowder era, 1500-1850 CE 161 10.4 Imperial China and the nomad anomaly, 200 BCE-1500 CE 164 10.5 Early China, 1600-200 BCE 169 11.1 Categorizing information technology 172 11.2 Calculating information technology scores 173 11.3 Estimates of Western information technology 183 11.4 Estimates of Eastern information technology 185 12.0 Margins of Error and Falsification 189 13.0 Discussion 198 References 201 3 List of Tables, Maps, Figures, and Graphs Tables 1 Eastern and Western core regions 14 2 Western energy capture, 14,000 BCE-2000 CE 34 3 Estimates of Roman GDP 41 4 Energy densities (after Smil 1991) 43 5 Eastern energy capture, 14,000 BCE-2000 CE 76 6 Western maximum settlement sizes, 8000 BCE-2000 CE 109 7 Eastern maximum settlement sizes, 4000 BCE-2000 CE 117 8 War-making capacity since 4000 BCE 141 9 Western information technology, 3000 BCE-2000 CE 181 10 Eastern information technology, 1300 BCE-2000 CE 182 11 Western social development scores, trait by trait, 14,000 BCE-2000 CE 189 12 Eastern social development scores, trait by trait, 14,000 BCE-2000 CE 191 Maps 1 The Lucky Latitudes 11 2 The shifting Eastern and Western cores 13 Figures 1 Superimposed houses at Abu Hureyra, Syria, 12,000-8000 BCE 63 2 The sequence of temples at Eridu, 5000-3000 BCE 64 Graphs 1 Eastern and Western energy capture, 14,000 BCE-2000 CE 19 2 Eastern and Western social development scores, 14,000 BCE-2000 CE 20 3 Earl Cook’s (1971) estimates of energy capture 29 4 Western energy capture, 14,000 BCE-2000 CE (linear-linear plot) 35 5 Western energy capture, 14,000 BCE-2000 CE (log-linear plot) 36 6 Western energy capture, 1700-2000 CE 39 7 Lead pollution and Mediterranean shipwrecks, 900 BCE–800 CE 46 8 Ancient and modern energy capture in the Western core (500 BCE– 200 CE, 1700–2000 CE) 49 9 Real wages of unskilled laborers, 1300-1800 (after Pamuk 2007) 54 10 Ancient, medieval, and modern energy capture in the Western core (500 BCE–2000 CE) 57 11 Western energy capture, 14,000 BCE and 500 BCE–2000 CE 59 12 Pre-agricultural to modern energy capture in the Western core, 14,000 BCE–2000 CE (millennial scale) 60 13 Arithmetic, geometric, and estimated increases in energy capture in the Western core, 14,000–500 BCE 69 14 Western energy capture, assuming lower Roman scores and higher early modern scores, 1500 BCE-2000 CE 73 15 Western energy capture, assuming lower Roman scores and higher early modern scores, compared with actual estimates, 1500 BCE-2000 CE 74 16 Gregory Clark’s (2007) estimates of income per person, 1000 BCE– 4 2000 CE 75 17 Eastern energy capture, 14,000 BCE–2000 CE (linear-linear plot) 77 18 Eastern energy capture, 14,000 BCE–2000 CE (log-linear plot) 78 19 Agricultural labor productivity, Europe and the Yangzi delta, 1300-1800 CE (after Allen 2006: Figure 2) 81 20 Real wages in Asia and Europe, 1738-1918 CE (after Allen et al. 2007: Figure 6) 81 21 Modern Eastern and Western energy capture, 1800-2000 CE 82 22 Eastern and Western energy capture, 1000-1200 and 1800-2000 CE 85 23 Mark Elvin’s (1973) graph of China’s “high-level equilibrium trap” 86 24 Rhoads Murphey’s (1977) graph of the rise of the West and decline of the East, 1600-1950 CE 88 25 Eastern energy capture, 1000-2000 CE 89 26 Eastern energy capture, 200 BCE-200 CE and 1000-2000 CE 91 27 Arithmetic, geometric, and estimated rates of growth in Eastern energy capture, 200-2000 CE 93 28 Eastern and Western energy capture, 200 BCE-2000 CE 94 29 Eastern energy capture, 14,000-9500 BCE and 200 BCE-2000 CE 95 30 Arithmetic, geometric, and estimated growth rates in Eastern energy capture, 9500-200 BCE 96 31 Eastern and Western energy capture, 9500-200 BCE 103 32 Eastern and Western city sizes, 8000 BCE-2000 CE 129 33 Western energy capture and city size, 14,000 BCE-2000 CE (log-linear scale) 130 34 Eastern energy capture and city size, 14,000 BCE-2000 CE (log-linear scale) 131 35 Western energy capture and city size, 14,000 BCE-2000 CE (linear-linear scale) 131 36 Eastern energy capture and city size, 14,000 BCE-2000 CE (linear-linear scale) 132 37 Eastern and Western city sizes, 4000-1500 BCE 132 38 Eastern and Western city sizes, 1000 BCE-1500 CE 133 39 Settlement sizes and levels of social development 135 40 Eastern and Western war-making capacity, 3000 BCE-2000 CE 142 41 Eastern and Western war-making capacity, 3000 BCE-2000 CE, using revised pre-2000 CE figures 142 42 Eastern and Western war-making capacity, 3000 BCE-2000 CE (log- linear scale) 143 43 Eastern and Western war-making capacity, 3000 BCE-2000 CE, using revised pre-2000 CE figures (log-linear scale) 144 44 Eastern and Western war-making capacity using revised figures, 3000 BCE-2000 CE, using revised pre-1900 CE figures 145 45 Eastern and Western war-making capacity, 3000 BCE-2000 CE, using revised pre-1900 CE figures (log-linear scale) 146 46 Eastern and Western war-making capacity, 1300-1900 CE 148 47 Eastern and Western war-making capacity, 1-1500 CE 151 48 Eastern and Western war-making capacity, 1-2000 CE 152 5 49 Eastern and Western war-making capacity, 1-1900 CE 152 50 Eastern and Western war-making capacity, 1-1800 CE 153 51 Western war-making capacity, 3000-1 BCE: arithmetic, geometric, and 154 estimated growth rates 52 Eastern and Western war-making capacity, 3000-1 BCE 156 53 War-making capacity in 2000 CE 159 54 Eastern and Western war-making capacity, 1500-1900 CE 163 55 Eastern and Western war-making capacity, 200 BCE-1600 CE 169 56 Eastern and Western information technology, 4000 BCE-2000 CE 177 57 Eastern and Western information technology, 4000 BCE-2000 CE (log-linear scale) 178 58 Eastern and Western information technology, 4000 BCE-2000 CE (scores modified for printing) 178 59 Eastern and Western information technology, 4000 BCE-2000 CE (log-linear scale, scores modified for printing) 179 60 Eastern and Western social development, 14,000 BCE-2000 CE, on a log-linear scale 193 61 Eastern and Western social development, 14,000 BCE-2000 CE, on a log-linear scale, increasing all Western scores by 10 percent and decreasing all Eastern scores by 10 percent 193 62 Eastern and Western social development, 14,000 BCE-2000 CE, on a log-linear scale, decreasing all Western scores by 10 percent and increasing all Eastern scores by 10 percent 194 63 Eastern and Western social development, 14,000 BCE-2000 CE, on a log-linear scale, increasing all Western scores by 10 percent and decreasing all Eastern scores by 10 percent 195 64 Eastern and Western social development, 14,000 BCE-2000 CE, on a log-linear scale, decreasing all Western scores by 20 percent and increasing all Eastern scores by 20 percent 196 6 1 Introduction In the 18th century CE, Western Europeans and their colonists on other continents began asking themselves a new question: why does the West seem to be taking over the world? And since at least the later 19th century, many of the people on the receiving end of Western commerce, colonization, imperialism, and acculturation have been wondering the same thing. Yet even now, there is little agreement on answers. At one end of the spectrum of theories are long-term lock-in models, suggesting that the West has been fated to dominate the rest since time immemorial, thanks to its culture, climate, resources, or beliefs.
At the other are short-term accident theories, arguing that nothing at all distinguished the West even as recently as 1800 CE, when lucky breaks suddenly gave it access to the power of fossil fuels and transformed the global balance of power. The reason there is so much controversy, I suggest in Why the West Rules—For Now (Morris 2010), is a lack of clarity over exactly what it is we are trying to explain. Because there is no agreement on the starting point, different analysts tend to focus on different periods of the past, using different kinds of evidence, and defining the terms in different ways. It is not surprising that they come to different conclusions.
The question is really one about social development, by which I mean a group’s ability to master its physical and intellectual environment to get things done. Long-term lock-in theorists tend to argue that Western social development has been higher than that in other parts of the world for many hundreds or even thousands of years; short-term accident theorists tend to argue that Western development only pulled ahead in the last half-dozen generations. If we really want to explain why the West rules, we need to measure social development and compare it across time and space. Only when we have established the basic pattern can we start asking why it takes the form it does.
In Chapter 3 and the Appendix of Why the West Rules—For Now (Morris 2010: 3-36, 623-45) I briefly describe the methods I used to calculate Eastern and Western social development scores from 14,000 BCE through 2000 CE, but a full account would have made an already long book even longer. In the past, historians have sometimes backed up books on broad historical questions with supplementary volumes of statistics and sources (e., Fogel and Engerman 1974), but it now seems more sensible to provide such a technical appendix in non-print forms. This pdf e-book supplements the printed book by explaining the methods in more detail, discussing possible objections to this approach, and providing references for the 7 evidence behind the calculations. The same material is also available in html format at my website http://www.
I have edited the html version slightly for this pdf version, reducing redundancy between sections, but the substance of the html and pdf versions is identical. 8 2 Formal definition Social development is the bundle of technological, subsistence, organizational, and cultural accomplishments through which people feed, clothe, house, and reproduce themselves, explain the world around them, resolve disputes within their communities, extend their power at the expense of other communities, and defend themselves against others’ attempts to extend power (Morris 2010: 144). Since the 1990s, debates within the West over the causes and likelihood of continuance of its global domination have intensified, probably driven largely by the People’s Republic of China’s economic takeoff (e., Acemoglu and Robinson, forthcoming; Clark 2007; Diamond 1997; Frank 1998; Goldstone 2009; Landes 1998; Maddison 2003, 2005, 2007a, 2007b; North et al. 2009; Pomeranz 2000; Turchin 2003, 2009; Turchin and Nefedov 2009; Wong 1997).