VIETNAM'S DIFFERENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA OVER TWO ISLANDS DISPUTE: PARACEL AND SPRATLY BY MISS LUONG ANH LINH A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS (ASIA PACIFIC STUDIES) THAMMASAT INSTITUTE OF AREA STUDIES THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY ACADEMIC YEAR 2018 COPY RIGHT OF THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY Ref. code: 25616066090124ABM VIETNAM'S DIFFERENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA OVER TWO ISLANDS DISPUTE: PARACEL AND SPRATLY BY MISS LUONG ANH LINH A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS (ASIA PACIFIC STUDIES) THAMMASAT INSTITUTE OF AREA STUDIES THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY ACADEMIC YEAR 2018 COPY RIGHT OF THAMMASAT UNIVERSITY Ref. code: 25616066090124ABM (1) Thesis Title VIETNAM'S DIFFERENT NEGOTIATIONS WITH CHINA OVER TWO ISLANDS DISPUTE: PARACEL AND SPRATLY Author Miss Luong Anh Linh Degree Master of Arts (Asia Pacific Studies) Major Field/Faculty/University Master of Arts (Asia Pacific Studies) Thammasat Institute of Area Studies Thammasat University Thesis Advisor Takashi Tsukamoto, Ph. Academic Year 2018 ABSTRACT The purpose of this study is to examine Vietnam‖s both bilateral and multilateral negotiations with China over Paracel and Spratly Islands, and to analyze why the dispute has yet to be negotiated via DOC (Declaration of Conduct) and Code of Conduct (COC).
The author argues that the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands, both located in the South China Sea (SCS); has become an obstacle in creating multilateral security in the region. This research will also explain Vietnam‖s preferable negotiation with China over two islands due to the dispute between China and Vietnam in the SCS are mixed with cultural and historical heritage fundamental to the understanding of their respective positions. Ensuring the sovereignty over the islands, for these countries, also means to ensure important economic and geopolitical interests in Asia Pacific. Keywords: Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, Bilateral Negotiation, Multilateral Negotiation, Vietnam‖s Perspective.
code: 25616066090124ABM (2) ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS It is always a pleasure to remind me the fine people at MAPS - Thammasat University for their sincere guidance I received to uphold my practical as well as academic skills in Asia – Pacific Studies. Suphat Suphachalasai (Director, Thammasat Institute of Area Studies) for giving us precious scholarships and Miss Thanyawee Chuanchuen (MAPS Program Manager) and Mr Md Zaidul Anwar Hj Md Kasim (Researcher, MAPS) have helped us to manage all matters during academic period. To my parents and sister, Tien, thank you for giving encouragement, enthusiasm and invaluable assistance to me. Without all this, I might not be able to complete this subject properly.
I must thank to Prof. Luu Quy Khuong and Miss Le Phuong Loan (Dean and Vice Dean of Department of International Studies, Da Nang University of foreign languages studies) for giving me the opportunity to undergo training abroad. Speaking of deepest gratefulness, I must mention that Dr. Takashi Tsukamoto (now professor, Yamanashi Gakuin University) is responsible for me who wrote this paper: first by mentoring me and later by having the patience with me when starting and following with encouragement when it seemed too difficult to be completed.
Besides, I would like to thank Dr. Lasse Schuldt from Thammasat University, Dr. William Tow (Professor, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific) and Dr. Sueo Sudo (Professor, Nanzan University) for their comments and suggestions.
This is indeed a controversial topic that I challenged myself to study it. Without the officers, researchers and experts (some retired) from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense and Paracel Islands Museum in Vietnam, this paper certainly could not finish at all. Special thanks to my friends in Thailand, Izza, Thurein, anh Linh, chi Thuy and em Hang for making academic life much less stressful than it could be. code: 25616066090124ABM (3) A paper is not enough for me to express the support and guidance I received from them almost for all the work I did there.
Finally, I apologize all other unnamed who helped me in various ways to have a good training. Miss Luong Anh Linh Ref. code: 25616066090124ABM (4) TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT (1) ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS (2) TABLE OF CONTENTS (4) LIST OF TABLES (7) LIST OF FIGURES (8) LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (9) CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Purpose and Significance of the study 1 1.5 Conceptual Framework 5 CHAPTER 2 DIFFERENCE DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: PARACEL AND 6 SPRATLY ISLANDS 2.2 The dispute between China and Southeast Asian countries 6 2.1 Views on Chinese Hegemony 7 2.2 Views on Vietnam‖s Perception 9 Ref.3 Historical Context of conflicts in the South China Sea – Paracels 11 and Spratlys 2.4 Facts of two Islands 12 2.5 China‖s Different Ways of Claiming Paracel and Spratly Islands 14 2.1 Illegal Nine Dash-line 14 2.2 Militarize in the South China Sea 16 2.6 Conclusion 18 CHAPTER 3 THE PARACEL ISLANDS DISPUTE: BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS 19 BETWEEN VIETNAM AND CHINA 3.2 The claims made and their bases 19 3.3 Effectiveness of Negotiations 22 3.4 How did DOC/COC contribute to Vietnam to negotiate with China over Paracel Island 25 3.5 Why Vietnam failed in settling bilaterally the dispute over the Paracel Island with China 28 3.6 Conclusion 30 CHAPTER 4 THE SPRATLY ISLANDS DISPUTE: MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS 32 WITHIN ASEAN AND WITH CHINA 4.2 The claims made and their bases 32 4.3 Key actors and their interests 34 4.4 A brief review of ASEAN involvement in the SCS Dispute 36 4.2 DOC/COC Negotiations 42 Ref.5 Why Vietnam prefer multilateral negotiations thus far 46 4.1 ASEAN Responsibilities in the South China Sea 46 4.6 Conclusion 52 CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 54 5.1 A brief of the South China Sea Dispute 54 5.2 Vietnam‖s drivers to the South China Sea Dispute 56 5.3 Role of COC in Vietnam‖s negotiation progress in the South China 57 Sea Dispute 5.4 How far has COC contributed to diplomatic negotiation‖s progress 59 over the SCS dispute 5.5 Promoting ASEAN conflict management‖s role in the South China 61 Sea REFERENCES 63 APPENDICES 74 APPENDIX A SPRATLY ISLANDS 74 APPENDIX B PARACEL ISLANDS 79 APPENDIX C RELEVANT PROVISIONS FROM 1982 UNCLOS 82 APPENDIX D COC FRAMEWORK 84 BIOGRAPHY 86 Ref. code: 25616066090124ABM (7) LIST OF TABLES Tables Page 2.1 Stand-off in the South China Sea 18 4.1 Comparison the dispute over the Parcel Island and 52 Spratly Islands between China and Vietnam Ref.
code: 25616066090124ABM (8) LIST OF FIGURES Figures Page 1.1 Map of Conflicting Territory Claims in the South China Sea 5 Ref. code: 25616066090124ABM (9) LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS Symbols/Abbreviations Terms AMM ASEAN Minister Meeting ADIZ Air Defense Identification Zone ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations ARF Asian Region Forum CBM's Confidence-Building Measures CLCS Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf COC Code of Conduct CPC Communist Party of China CUES Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea CSCAP Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific DOC Declare for Conduct EAS East Asia Summit IMO International Maritime Organization MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs OBOR One Belt One Road PRC The People's Republic of China ROC Republic of China (Taiwan) SCS The South China Sea UNCLOS the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea USA The United States of America SDNT Single Draft the South China Sea Code of Conduct Negotiating Text SOM ASEAN-China Senior Official Meeting Ref. code: 25616066090124ABM 1 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose and Significance of the study The South China Sea (SCS) is one of the most significant and most controversial sea lanes of the 21st century, so its dispute has been researched from the past until now. Christian Le Mière and Sarah Raine, researchers at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) stated in their book “Regional Disorder: The South China Sea disputes” that the South China Sea dispute is about domestic political will to reflect emerging popular nationalism and about international political will to find peace to security structures in Asia.
They argue this disputes matter, not because they prove to be a game changer in Asia, but their reflectiveness in changing game in Asia. They also imply the story of South China Sea about claimants and non-claimants, regional power and extra-regional power that involve state actors and non-state actors including oil companies, fishermen, and even pirates (Miere & Raine, 2013). On the other hand, Bill Hayton, a longtime BBC journalist with his latest work, “The South China Sea: The struggle of Power in Asia” proves that politics, history and mineral resources are China‖s ambition on the SCS. He explains China‖s claims to one of the world‖s major trading routes and its exploration in waters off the Paracel Islands (Hayton, 2014, p.
Not just that, Nguyen Hong Thao, a second vice chairman of the United Nations International Law Commission demonstrates that the South China Sea is notorious for the protracted sovereignty dispute over the Spratly Islands with the maritime claims of five claimant states (Thao, 2015). Moreover, Hui-Yi Katherine Tseng, a Research Associate from National University of Singapore indicates from her book “Rethinking South China Sea Disputes: The Untold Dimensions and Great Expectations” that the general perception of the story in the South China Sea began when the Chinese government declared the Nine dash-line in 1947. She pointed out the volume including South Ref. code: 25616066090124ABM 2 China Sea crises as a routine in a country‖s political landscape that displays a far more intricate picture.
Despite complex political considerations, the essence of the disputes focuses on resource completion (Tseng, 2016). Max Fisher (2016), an American journalist at the New York Times in the field of political science and social science agrees with Tseng that the basic level of this dispute is a conflict between China and a few Southeast Asian claimant nations including some of the most strategic maritime territory. The Nine-dash line of China indeed encircled most of the waters in the South China Sea. In addition, China claims that “indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoil thereof”, with nine-line segments encircling most of the SCS and 2 islands Spratly and Paracel, the so-called “9 dash line”.
There is also China's newest law fare approach that claims to a narrower “Four shas (4S)” (Chinese for four sands). Ma Xinhua, the deputy head of the Law Department and the Chinese Foreign Ministry, issued a statement asserting China's sovereignty over “Four Sha” including four island groups: Paracels Islands (Xisha), Spratlys Islands (Nansha), Mcclesfield Bank (Zhongsha) and Pratas Islands (Dongsha). At the same time, it also required the right to enjoy the vast waters (almost all the SCS) surrounding these four archipelagos. He also emphasized that the area was China's historic waters and was also a part of China's 200 nautical miles EEZ.
Beijing claims ownership by asserting that the “Four Sha” is a part of China's extended continental shelf. China's land reclamation activities had protested against several of the interested claimant states, particularly Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and US. China has created joint development as a provisional measure before settlement of sovereignty disputes (Peace Place Library, n. Those views explain China‖s political intrigue that occupies the entire SCS.
However, not only the generalization of the dispute over China's irrational Nine- dash line from its political power struggle, the involvement of different claimant nations competing for sovereignty over Paracel and Spratly Island also play a significant role. The differences in content of the sovereignty dispute in the South Ref. code: 25616066090124ABM 3 China Sea between different Southeast Asian nations with China, most notably Vietnam and the Philippines, deeply reflected China's hegemony. More than that, most other claimants consider the nine-dash line as the starting point of negotiations for joint development as “the land dominates the sea” (Mahan‖s theory) that contracts principle of UNCLOS, so a coastal state can claim maritime zones based only on land over which it has sovereignty (Phuong, 2017).
Vietnam is the only nation has both bilateral and multilateral disputes with China over the two islands: Paracel and Spratly long-lasting many centuries.