China’s Military Modernization, Japan’s Normalization and the South China Sea Territorial Disputes Zenel Garcia Tai Lieu Chat Luong China’s Military Modernization, Japan’s Normalization and the South China Sea Territorial Disputes Zenel Garcia China’s Military Modernization, Japan’s Normalization and the South China Sea Territorial Disputes Zenel Garcia Government Department St. Lawrence University Canton, NY, USA ISBN 978-3-030-12826-5 ISBN 978-3-030-12827-2 (eBook) https://doi.1007/978-3-030-12827-2 Library of Congress Control Number: 2019931873 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Cover illustration: © John Rawsterne/patternhead.com This Palgrave Pivot imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland I dedicate this book to my mother, Mayulis Calvo, whose unwavering support and dedication made this manuscript possible. Contents 1 Introduction 1 2 The South China Sea Disputes 17 3 Sino-Japanese Security Relations 35 4 China’s Military Modernization 45 5 Japan’s Normalization 61 6 Republic of the Philippines Case Study 79 7 Socialist Republic of Vietnam Case Study 95 8 Conclusion 109 References 125 Index 141 vii List of Maps Map.1 SCS maritime claims (Source EIA: http://www.gov/ countries/regions-topics.cfm?fips=scs) 19 Map.2 9-dash map (Source United Nations: http://www.org/ Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/submission_ vnm_37_2009.htm) 21 ix List of Tables Table 4.1 Spratly archipelago features occupied by the People’s Republic of China 53 Table 6.1 Spratly archipelago features occupied by the Republic of the Philippines 80 Table 7.1 Spratly archipelago features occupied by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 97 xi CHAPTER 1 Introduction Abstract This chapter addresses the relevance of the South China Sea (SCS) as a maritime highway, a source of hydrocarbons, and as a source of food and livelihood. In particular, it focuses on how the intersection of economic, energy, and food security are too important to ignore, particularly in the context of competing territorial disputes, overlap- ping exclusive economic zones (EEZs), and growing nationalism make the disputes too important to ignore. Consequently, the SCS disputes are reshaping East and Southeast Asian security dynamics by influencing the alignment policies claimant and non-claimant countries alike.
Keywords South China Sea · Territorial disputes · East Asia · Southeast Asia Background East and Southeast Asia have played a crucial global economic role in the recent years; posting annual growth at rates exceeding the global aver- age and contributing to over a third of the global economic growth.1 However, despite its economic vitality, East and Southeast Asia are plagued by ongoing maritime territorial disputes among pivotal states in the region. These disputes not only threaten the economic and political © The Author(s) 2019 1 Z. Garcia, China’s Military Modernization, Japan’s Normalization and the South China Sea Territorial Disputes, https://doi. GARCIA stability of the contending parties, they directly affect global trade net- works and regional stability.
The most critical of the ongoing rows in East and Southeast Asia is the South China Sea (SCS) territorial disputes. This is the result of a number of factors: (1) the SCS’s geopolitical posi- tion as maritime superhighway, (2) its potential as an energy source, and (3) and its abundant marine resources. In other words, the SCSs pivotal role means that even minor local clashes over the disputes can have seri- ous spillover effects in the region and beyond. Maritime Superhighway Stretching from the Strait of Malacca in the southwest to the Luzon Straits in the northeast, the SCS serves as one of the main arteries for global shipping.
Over “50% of the world’s merchant fleet tonnage crosses through the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok Straits, with the major- ity continuing on into the South China Sea.”2 The tanker traffic that passes through the Malacca Straits “is more than three times greater than the Suez Canal traffic, and well over five times more than the traffic of the Panama Canal.”3 The Energy Information Administration (EIA), an agency of the US Department of Energy, estimates that 30% of the world’s global maritime crude oil trade, amounting to 15 million barrels per day (BPD), traverses the SCS.4 This means that one-third of global crude moves through the SCS, making this the second most important chokepoint for oil trade after the Strait of Hormuz.5 The EIA also esti- mates that 40% of the global liquefied natural gas (LNG), or 4.7 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), traverses the SCS on to major regional importers like China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.6 Lastly, significant quantities of coal from Australia and Indonesia, which are the world’s two largest coal exporters, are transported through the SCS to markets around the world, particularly China and Japan.7 The SCS serves as a crucial maritime highway through which the sea lanes of communications (SLOCs) of most countries traverse. In other words, the national security of many countries rests on the amicable resolution to the SCS territorial disputes and the continued adherence to the international norm of freedom of navigation. This is particularly important for countries that rely heavily on energy imports and whose economies are primarily driven by exports of manufactured goods like China, which has laid claims to all land features in the SCS and their sur- rounding waters, and Japan which is not a claimant in the SCS disputes 1 INTRODUCTION 3 but sees China’s increasing assertiveness in the region as detrimental to the freedom of navigation, and consequently, its national security. In essence, Japan relies on its South China Sea SLOC for 80% of its oil sup- ply and 70% of its exports.
Therefore, “any disruption of the maritime traffic due to frictions between claimant states or undue control by a sin- gle dominant power would have a catastrophic impact on Japan. For this reason, the SCS is seen as a “national security concern” by “diplomatic authorities.”8 Energy Deposits The second factor that makes the SCS increasingly important is its esti- mated energy deposits. The robust economic growth in the region is expected to increase the demand for fossil fuels. The EIA projects that Asian countries outside of the Organization for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD) will have a 2.6% annual increase in demand for liquid fuels.
This will result in an increased share of global consump- tion from 20% in 2008 to 30% by 2035.9 Non-OECD Asian countries’ natural gas consumption is also expected to grow at an annual rate of 3.9%; increasing their share of global consumption from 10% in 2008 to 19% by 2035. The “EIA expects China to account for 43 percent of that growth.”10 Additionally, “with Southeast Asian domestic oil pro- duction projected to remain flat or decline as consumption rises, the region’s countries will look to new sources of energy to meet domestic demand.”11 As a result, these countries are increasingly looking to the SCS as a potential source of energy to meet national demands in order to continue promoting economic growth. This has created an imperative for securing parts of the SCS as a way to acquire additional sources of hydro- carbons. However, the territorial disputes in the region have hindered efforts to conduct proper exploration of energy reserves in the area.
The lack of adequate oil and gas exploration in the SCS has resulted in a number of conflicting claims regarding the deposit amounts in the seabed. The Chinese have been the most optimistic in their esti- mates. Zhang Dawei, an official at China’s Ministry of Land Resources, has optimistically claimed that the “South China Sea might hold 23-40 billion tons of oil reserves.”12 That figure is larger than China’s current onshore resources. The Chinese have also estimated that the area may contain more than 2000 tcf of natural gas reserves.13 A dif- ferent study conducted by the state-owned Chinese National Offshore 4 Z.
GARCIA Oil Company (CNOOC) estimates that the SCS holds around 125 billion barrels of oil and 500 tcf of natural gas. However, no inde- pendent studies have been able to confirm any of the optimistic estimates provided by Chinese agencies or state-owned corporations.14 A 1995 study conducted by Russia’s Research Institute of Geology of Foreign Countries concluded that deposits were closer to 6 billion barrels of oil in the Spratly Islands, of which 70% would be natural gas.15 Two American agencies have also conducted surveys of the area, pro- viding yet another set of conflicting figures. The EIA estimates that the oil and natural gas reserves in the SCS are 11 billion barrels and 190 tcf respectively. The report indicates that these figures represent proven and probable reserves and are much closer to the high-end estimate.16 In the next survey: The U.
Geological Survey (USGS) analyzed the potential for undis- covered conventional oil and gas fields within several geologic prov- inces of Southeast Asia in 2010 as part of its World Petroleum Resources Assessment Project. The study included a significant area of the South China Sea, which the USGS estimates may contain anywhere between 5 and 22 billion barrels of oil and between 70 and 290 trillion cubic feet of gas in as-yet undiscovered resources (not including the Gulf of Thailand and other areas adjacent to the South China Sea). These additional resources are not considered commercial reserves at this time because it is unclear how economically feasible it would be to extract them.17 Despite the conflicting claims, however, there is a general consensus among the rival claimants in the SCS that the seabed possesses valuable hydrocarbon resources that are desperately needed in order to promote economic growth in their countries. Chinese state media in particular has referred to the area as the “Second Persian Gulf,” indicating the impor- tance attached to the potential hydrocarbon resources in the SCS by Beijing.18 Marine Resources The third major factor that makes the SCS increasingly important is its role as a fisheries ground.
This is underscored by the fact that by 1995 the SCS was contributing 12% of the total marine global production as well as 54% of marine culture production.19 By 2015 the SCS remained 1 INTRODUCTION 5 one of the top five productive fishing zones in the world, where 55% of the world’s fishing vessels were producing 12% of the world’s catch and officially employing 3.7 million workers in the region.20 In other words, the SCS is not only an important global fishery, but also a key component of the regional economies. Additionally, the SCS serves as an important source of nutrition for the millions of East and Southeast Asians. For example, during the 3-year span of 2000–2003 the per capita consumption of fish in the region was 26. Compared to the world average of 16.3 kg a year, it is clear that the populations inhabiting the littoral countries of the SCS rely heavily on fish and other marine foods for nutrition and protein.21 In fact, “fish protein is more than 22 percent of the average Asian diet, significantly higher than the global average of 16 percent.